Herding and contrarianism in a financial trading experiment with endogenous timing by Park, Andreas & Sgroi, Daniel
 
 
 
Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading Experiment  
with Endogenous Timing 
 
Andreas Park and Daniel Sgroi 
 
No 868 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WARWICK ECONOMIC RESEARCH PAPERS 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 
Herding and Contrarianism in a Financial Trading
Experiment with Endogenous Timing
Andreas Park∗
University of Toronto
Daniel Sgroi†
University of Warwick
This version: October 1, 2008
Abstract
We undertook the first market trading experiments that allowed heterogeneously
informed subjects to trade in endogenous time, collecting over 2000 observed trades.
Subjects’ decisions were generally in line with the predictions of exogenous-time
financial herding theory when that theory is adjusted to allow rational informa-
tional herding and contrarianism. While herding and contrarianism did not arise
as frequently as predicted by theory, such behavior occurs in a significantly more
pronounced manner than in comparable studies with exogenous timing. Types with
extreme information traded earliest. Of those with more moderate information,
those with signals conducive to contrarianism traded earlier than those with infor-
mation conducive to herding.
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1 Introduction
Rational herding is an important tool in analyzing how and why economic agents learn
through observation in groups (Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch
(1992)). Economic agents constantly learn from others, through direct conversation, news-
papers, observing actions and typically in financial markets, through observing price move-
ments or the buy and sell decisions of others. Informational herding arises in situations
where people observe the actions of others, derive information from them and then, seem-
ingly disregarding their own information, follow the majority action. A central lesson
of informational herding theory is that what we can observe is not necessarily a direct
indication of the information possessed by others. Furthermore, while for each individual
following the herd is likely to be a better decision than ignoring the actions of others
altogether, the collective choice of the herd is still not necessarily the correct choice, and
certainly it is not as reliable a choice as when all individuals pool their information.
It is tempting to argue that this problem must be endemic to finance, where persistent
price spikes and crashes, linked movements across national boundaries, and often-cited
“crazy” market behavior might be considered prime candidates for a herding analysis.
Indeed many highly respected financial commentators and economists have linked herd-
ing behavior with financial fragility, including the current period of world-wide financial
instability.1 One could argue that a few early, perhaps incorrect, movements by visible
traders induce discontinuous price jumps in one direction or the other, potentially leav-
ing share prices far from their fundamental value. If we could describe such movements
using the tools of herding theory, not only would we better understand financial mar-
kets, but we would have an intellectual framework to ponder policy suggestions aimed
at avoiding painful financial crises. Nevertheless, early work on financial market herding
had difficulties identifying such behavior in an environment with informationally efficient
prices.2
1See Shiller (2008) in which Robert Shiller highlights the scope for herding theory as a potential
explanation for the current housing and subprime mortgage market difficulties in the USA and elsewhere.
2An early result by Avery and Zemsky (1998) showed that in a simple financial market-trading setting
with two values herding is not possible because the market price always separates people with good and
bad information. While they also presented an example with moving prices and herding, attributing
their finding to ‘multidimensional uncertainty/risk’ (where investors have a finer information structure
than the market), in their example prices hardly move, and herding is ‘self-defeating’ as herd-buys
eventually stop the herd. Since the underlying ‘multidimensional’ information structure seemed very
specific, and since the implications of herding as identified in their paper seemed very short-term, rational
herding was typically not thought a good explanation for financial crises. See, for instance, Brunnermeier
(2001), Bikhchandani and Sunil (2000), Chamley (2004), or Alevy, Haigh and List (2007). Subsequent
experimental studies by Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005), which
we will comment on in detail below, confirmed this finding. Cipriani and Guarino (2007) is a recent
experimental study of the kind of herd behavior that Avery and Zemsky did identify.
1 Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
The work presented here is the second part of a project to examine experimentally a
theoretical framework that does admit herding and contrarianism as rational outcomes.
The first part of the project employed a setup in which people acted in an exogenously
defined sequence, directly examining the set of conditions under which herding and con-
trarianism can occur as identified in Park and Sabourian (2008). The second part, pre-
sented in this paper, is the first experimental work to combine an informational herding
story with moving prices and, crucially, endogenous timing. We explicitly allow subjects
to choose both how and when to trade and, in some treatments, to trade twice. This
enables us to analyze the impact of information on both the direction of a trade and also
on the timing decision.
The importance of analyzing endogenous-time as opposed to exogenous-time is hard
to overestimate. First, the extra layer of realism is considerable: in real markets traders
do not stand in line waiting their turn to act. In fact, one of the key features of financial
frenzies is the clustering of actions in time, which cannot be examined in a sequential
trading setting.
Second, allowing people to choose both the direction and the time of their trade
greatly complicates the subject’s decision problem. A testament to the complexity of
the problem is that there is currently no theoretical model that encompasses a dynamic
trading decision with multiple heterogeneously informed agents. However, the lack of
a full-fleshed theory does not inhibit an experimental examination of people’s behavior
under tightly controlled conditions.
Third, with endogenous time the effect of herding and contrarianism may well be much
more pronounced than with exogenous timing. To see this, observe that herding types
are, at least by casual intuition, in some way or other less confident about the value of
an asset. One may then speculate that they delay their trading decision to gain more
information by observing others. So once they do trade, their herding behavior may well
lead to stronger price distortions under endogenous-timing than exogenous-timing. Our
results indicate that indeed herd behavior becomes much more pronounced when traders
can decide when to trade. Thus existing studies that deny traders the opportunity to
time their actions may be underplaying likely herding and contrarian behavior.
It is also worth noting that the experiment is also one of the largest yet to examine
rational herding in a laboratory setting, with about 2000 trades spread across 6 separate
treatments.
To simplify the exposition, we will distinguish and separate the decision of the trading
direction from the timing decision; we will refer to the former as the static decision
problem, and the latter as the dynamic problem. All the while we emphasize that these
two belong together in the full equilibrium problem.
2 Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
The Static Decision Problem. The ‘static’ theoretical model underlying our
experiment is a sequential trading setup in the tradition of Glosten and Milgrom (1985)
in which risk-neutral subjects trade single units of a financial security with a competitive
market maker. Past trades and prices are public information, and the market maker
adjusts the price after each transaction to include the new information revealed by this
trade. We differ from Glosten and Milgrom by admitting endogenous timing, whereas in
their model traders act at exogenous times. In our specification, there are three possible
values and three possible signals (high, middle, or low); each subject receives a private
realization of one of these signals. There are three possible actions (buy, pass, or sell). In
this underlying static view, rational subjects should buy if their expectation, conditional
on all private and public information, is above the price and sell if it is below.
A key result of herding theory is that much depends upon the shape of the underlying
conditional signal distribution. Put simply, subjects with a conditional signal distribution
that is bi-polar (“U-shaped”), with weight at the extremes, switch their optimal action
from buying to selling or vice versa because they update their expectations faster upwards
than the price rises, and so they may rationally herd. Alternatively, with single polar
information (“hill-shaped”) they adjust their expectation downwards slower than the price
falls and thus switch from selling to buying, acting in a rational contrarian manner.3 In
our specification there are also two signal types that never switch their action: one type
always sells (the “low” signal type), the other always buys (the “high” signal type).
Herding or contrarianism thus stems from “middle” types.
The Dynamic Decision Problem. We employed two different classes of treat-
ments: in the first, people are allowed to trade at most once, in the second they can trade
twice. The seminal paper which studies this problem with a single irreversible action
and without moving prices is Chamley and Gale (1994). A key message of their work is
that decision-makers will move very quickly, since waiting only makes sense when new
information arises. Furthermore, any period of low activity can produce a general lull
in behavior as each decision-maker decides to delay further to await more information.
Both of these insights are difficult to transfer into a setting where prices can move in
response to actions, because new public information will immediately be incorporated
into the price. Smith (2000) presents a single-trade setup, in which only a single informed
trader is considered. He shows that people who receive signals that are either good or
bad news (as is the case for our high and low signals) should trade ‘early’, and he also
presents an example of a U-shaped signal structure under which people optimally delay.
Alternatively, Ivanov, Levin and Peck (2008) argue that generically only subjects with
3A full description of this process is undertaken in Section 3 below.
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sufficient foresight are likely to delay to take advantage of new information, while other
more self-contained or myopic subjects are unlikely to do so.
Results. The overall fit of the static theoretical model is roughly 73%, which com-
pares well with other experimental work that allows exogenous timing such as Drehmann
et al (2005), Cipriani and Guarino (2005, 2007) and Park and Sgroi (2008). Broken down
by player type, these numbers are 84%, 54% and 86% for the low, the middle and the
high signal type respectively. Thus while the fit is very high for the high and low signal
types, it is lower for middle signal types. One obvious reason is that the decision with the
middle signal is much more difficult: high and low signal types would make no mistakes
if they decide simply to stick to their initial decision, whereas middle signal types have
to follow the development of prices very carefully. Finally, the overall fit is similar to the
results in our companion paper on exogenous timing, Park and Sgroi (2008).
The implicit hypothesis in the static rational model is that middle signal types are more
prone to herd behavior or contrarianism conditional on the signal distribution. Indeed,
this is what we observe: having a U-shaped signal increases the probability of engaging in
herding behavior by about 30%; similarly the hill-shaped signal increases the probability
of engaging in contrarian behavior by 35% compared to all other signals. Receiving any
other signal, in fact, reduces the chance of herding or contrarianism. The effect of the
herding signal in particular is much stronger than in the exogenous time setting, studied
in our companion paper. There we found a marginal effect of roughly 6% which is a strong
indication of the importance of endogenous timing.
We also find evidence that people with the high signal (good-news) and the low signal
(bad-news) trade systematically earlier than people with the middle (hill- or U-shaped)
signal. Of the latter, those with single-polar information (hill-shape) trade earlier than
those with bi-polar (U-shaped) information. In economic terms this implies that contrar-
ians should act comparatively earlier than herding types. A corollary to this statement is
that the herd is triggered by some rational people trading quickly in one direction.
Next, there is evidence of intertemporal clustering of trades in the sense of leader-
follower patterns: a significant percentage of all trades (about 50-55%) occurs within an
interval of 1.5 seconds. Information, however, seems to play no role in these patterns
which instead seem intrinsic to all signal types’ behavior.
While we believe that our data indicates that people act in the spirit of the rational
model, we also examined several alternative hypotheses, including different assumptions
on risk preferences, to see if we could further add to our understanding. In general,
alternative models produced no extraordinary insights. An exception are error adjustment
models or probability over- or under-weighing schemes which may be able to improve
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the fit, but only at the cost of implicitly ruling out some interesting behavior (such as
herding).4
To summarize the key results, We find that: (a) rational herding and contrarianism
do arise in accordance with the theory and are triggered by the people who hold certain
signals as predicted by the theory, and (b) timing behavior is systematically influenced by
signals in that people with clear signals (good, bad and single-polar) move before people
with ambiguous signals.
Related Experiments. The first published paper to consider herding in endogenous-
time was Sgroi (2003), a close implementation of the theoretical Chamley and Gale (1994)
framework, which was also examined experimentally in Ziegelmeyer, My, Vergnaud and
Willinger (2005). Neither of these experiments allowed a moving price and were not
designed to examine financial trading environments. There are two related experimen-
tal papers that do analyze people’s timing behavior in a financial market environment.5
Bloomfield, O’Hara and Saar (2005) study a financial market in which people can trade
repeatedly throughout a trading day, but without considering herding or contrarianism.
The focus of their study is on the timing behavior of some informed insiders and the
choice of limit- or market-orders depending on the time. The key to their setup is not the
kind of information so much as the fact that people have information. Perhaps the closest
link between our work and Bloomfield et al. (2005) is that they also use a controlled
experiment to glean insights into forces that drive trading behavior in the absence of an
underlying guiding theory.
Ivanov et al. (2008) implement Levin and Peck (2008) (which relates to Chamley
and Gale (1994)). While they also study the timing behavior of people’s investment
choices, they do not consider a setup with moving prices; their model is best described
as capturing the decision of a non-financial (green-field) investment. They find that first,
behavior can be classified into three categories: self-contained (ignoring information from
observing others), myopic (acting upon the current best decision, ignoring the option to
learn from others in the future), and foresighted (the perfectly rational decision). While
we have many subjects and many trades, we feel that there is not sufficient variation in our
framework to warrant such a description for our traders; instead, in all of our behavioral
analyses we assume that informed traders follow a single behavioral rule. Our focus is
also different in that we try to understand how different information structures affect the
decision to trade.
4For a full explanation and more detail on the alternative models examined see the appendix.
5There are at least four other papers that study herding behavior in a financial market environment:
Drehmann et al. (2005), Cipriani and Guarino (2005, 2007), and our own prequel, Park and Sgroi (2008).
None of these studies, however, allows subjects to decide the timing of their trading decisions.
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Overview. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we
define herding and contrarianism formally. We then examine the theoretical framework
in more detail in Section 3 and also discuss the modifications undertaken to better fit
a laboratory experiment. Section 4 examines the design of the experiment, including a
discussion of the nature of the software, the different information structures embodied
in the alternative treatments, the information provided to subjects and the hypotheses
that are implied by the theory. Section 5 presents the results of the experiments and
their fit to the rational model. Section 6 carries out a formal econometric analysis of
the static decision. Section 7 considers the impact that prices have on decisions. Section
8 studies the relation of the first and second trades (for instance, is there much “buy-
low, sell-high” trading). Section 9 analyzes the timing behavior. Section 10 summarizes
the key findings and concludes. Appendix A outlines results from an examination of
alternative behavioral explanations for the observed data. The subject instructions and
other supporting materials are provided in the final appendices.
2 Formal Definition of Herding
In the spirit of Avery and Zemsky, and Park and Sabourian, we employ a set of definitions
for herding (contrarian) behavior in which a trader switches from buying to selling after
observing a history with increasing (decreasing) prices; and for our experimental analysis,
we shall categorize herding as such. A very loose intuition is that herding types have
increasing demand functions: they sell when prices are low and buy when they are high.
We use notation Ht for the trading history at time t; this history includes all past actions,
their timing, and the transaction prices; H1 is the initial history.
Definition 1 (Herd- and Contrarian-Behavior)
(a) A trader engages in herd-buying after a history of trade Ht if and only if
(H1) he would sell at the initial history H1,
(H2) he buys at history Ht, and
(H3) prices at Ht are higher than at H1.
Sell herding is defined analogously.
(b) A trader engages in buy-contrarianism after a history of trade Ht if and only if
(C1) he would sell at the initial history H1,
(C2) he buys at history Ht, and
(C3) prices at Ht are lower than at H1.
Sell-contrarianism is defined analogously.
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According to the above definitions, agents with a particular signal engage in herding
if, as a result of observing the behavior of others, they take a different action from the
one that they would take initially. Thus, herding in our set-up (as well as in Avery
and Zemsky) represents any history-induced switch of opinion in the direction of the
crowd, whereas the logical counterpart, contrarianism, describes a history-induced switch
of opinion against the direction of the crowd.
3 The Underlying Theory
Subjects face a complex decision problem, having to decide both on the timing and direc-
tion of their trade. We split the description here into the trade-direction and the timing
component, while noting that a full equilibrium model requires a simultaneous description
of both.
3.1 The Static Decision of the Trading Direction
All traders trade a security with an uninformed market maker. The security takes one
of three possible liquidation values, V1 < V2 < V3, each equally likely. Traders can be
informed, in which case they receive a conditionally independent signal about the true
value of the security, or they can be a noise trader in which case they trade for reasons
outside the model. The market maker sets a single price at which he is willing to buy or
sell one unit of the security.6
Every trader is a noise trader with a fixed probability (25% in our setting) and buys
or sells each with 50% probability. Informed traders receive one of three signals: S1, S2
or S3. Signal S1 is generated with higher probability in state V1 than V2, and likewise in
state V2 than state V3. The reverse holds for signal S3. This implies that the recipient
of signal S1 shifts probability weight towards the lowest state (S1 is ‘bad news’), whereas
the recipient of S3 shifts weight towards the highest state (S3 is ‘good news’). Signal S2
can take several different shapes which we will outline shortly.
All past trades and prices are public information. The market maker follows a simple
pricing rule by setting the unique trading price as the expectation of the true value of the
security, conditional on all publicly available past information; this price does not account
for possible timing decisions of traders but instead is purely backward looking. Once a
trader decides to act, he buys if his expectation conditional on his private signal and on
6This is a simplification of the Park and Sabourian model, which itself a sequential trading model in
the style of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In these models, a competitive market maker sets a zero-profit
bid and offer price. In our experiments, as is standard in the related experimental literature, we dispense
with bid- and ask-prices and focus instead on a single trading price to minimize complexity.
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the information derived from past trades exceeds the price, and he sells if this expectation
is below the price.
The following conditions describe the shape of the herding candidate’s conditional
signal distribution (henceforth: csd):
increasing ⇔ Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V2) < Pr(S|V3)
decreasing ⇔ Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V3)
U-shaped ⇔ Pr(S|Vi) > Pr(S|V2) for i = 1, 3
hill-shaped ⇔ Pr(S|Vi) < Pr(S|V2) for i = 1, 3.
A signal is called csd-monotonic if its csd is either increasing or decreasing. If Pr(S|V1) >
Pr(S|V3) or Pr(S|V1) < Pr(S|V3) holds then signals are negatively and positively biased
respectively. A negatively biased U-shaped csd is referred to as a negative U-shape,
likewise for hill-shape and positive biases.
The underlying decisions that we categorize are assumed to be static or myopic, i.e.
we ignore possible dynamic considerations that may govern a subject’s trading decision.
Moreover, we also assume that every past decision was taken on the basis of only static
considerations. Applied to the experimental design in which bid-ask-spreads are ignored,
the analysis in Park-Sabourian implies the following:7
Theorem 1 (Herding and Contrarian Behavior, Park and Sabourian (2008))
(a) Types S1 and S3 never herd.
(b) Type S2 buy-herds (sell-herds) if and only if his csd is negative (positive) U-shaped.
(c) Type S2 is a buy-(sell-) contrarian if and only if his csd is negative (positive)
hill-shaped.
First observe, that a buy-herding trader would be selling at the initial history (H1/C1).
Since the prior is uniform, this implies that sellers attach more weight to the lowest than
the highest state, i.e. Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V3). Next, buy-herding also requires that prices
have increased (H3); this occurs if and only if the probability of the lowest state is smaller
than that of the highest state.
Sufficiency can be best explained by imagining that the probability of the lowest
state V1 has dropped to the point where the state can be ignored relative to states V2
and V3. Then a trader who is buying must attach more weight to state V3 than V2,
Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2). This holds for trader S3 but this type would not be selling at the
initial history. Combining the requirements Pr(S|V3) > Pr(S|V2) and Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V3),
we observe that a U-shaped signal allows herding.
7Note that ‘S herds’ is to be read as ‘S herds with positive probability’.
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A similar idea applies to the occurrence of contrarian behavior where the price falls
and so that state V3 can be ignored relative to V1 and V2. Now a buyer must put more
weight on V2 than V1, Pr(S|V2) > Pr(S|V1) which, together with Pr(S|V1) > Pr(S|V3) lets
us conclude that a hill-shaped signal allows contrarianism.8
3.2 The Dynamic Decision of the Trading Time
Most work on financial market microstructure constructs the trading decision to be either
stationary or static.9 Those that do analyze a dynamic problem usually allow at most
one informed insider.10
The theoretical paper closest to ours is Smith (2000) which models a single trader who
can make a single trade early or late. Smith shows that this trader will trade early if his
signal is either good or bad news.11 Moreover, Smith also presents an example with a
U-shaped signal and shows that within his framework this trader should indeed delay.12
Applying Smith to our framework, the S1 and S3 types have bad-news and good-news
signals respectively and thus they should always act immediately.13
Matters are more complex for the S2 types. A U-shaped signal appears to be rather
uninformative, giving only an indication that an extreme state has happened. It thus
seems reasonable to assert that these types should delay initially to accumulate informa-
tion. A hill-shaped signal, on the other hand, is a strong indication that the middle state
occurred. Consequently, initially there seems to be no sense for hill-shaped S2 types to
trade. If, however, prices move away from the middle state, then it should pay for the
hill-shaped S2 types to trade against this general flow because they should expect prices
to revert to the middle value. Comparing traders with hill- and U-shaped signals, it seems
reasonable that the U-shaped types delay for longer to get a better sense of the direction
in which the market is moving whereas for hill-shaped types, it may make sense to act
quickly on deviations of the price from the middle value.
The statements so far cover the case of a single trade, and there is no theoretical work
8The argument for necessity is more involved and we refer the reader to Park and Sabourian (2008).
9The classic market theoretical market microstructure literature in surveyed in Hasbrouck (2007) or
Vives (2008).
10See, for instance, Kyle (1985), Back and Baruch (2004), or Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004).
11There is an additional requirement in that the distribution of public information satisfies the mono-
tone likelihood ratio property (see Milgrom (1981)); this condition is to ensure that, effectively, the true
state will be revealed in a systematic manner. Our experimental setup will have this feature.
12Smith’s result are about sufficiency and thus provide no general answer as to how U- or hill-shaped
types should trade.
13An alternative approach to Smith’s finding is that the expectations that the S1 and S3 types form
over the future price are super- and sub-martingales respectively. For instance, an S3 type would always
expect that there are more people who have the same signal and thus expects prices to rise. For their
own expectation, however, the law of iterated expectations applies.
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in the literature that provides guidelines as to how people would optimally act when there
are multiple heterogeneously informed traders who can trade repeatedly. One reason is
the sheer complexity of the issue, having to account for the impact of one’s own decision
on others’ actions, how their reaction affects one’s own decision, iterated ad infinitum.
Despite the lack of a theory to guide our analysis, we can conjecture possible behaviors.
With two trades, people can either trade twice in the same direction or they can trade
in opposite directions (sell-buy or buy-sell); the latter is referred to as a ‘return’-trade.
With return trades possible, we must revisit the decision about the trading direction for
it is now conceivable that a dynamic trading strategy might involve trading at a static
expected loss.
Consider first the S1 types. Suppose that they perform a return-trade, for instance,
by buying early and selling late. Then after these two transactions, they still hold a
share, and on this single share they make an expected loss. While they may gain on the
return transaction, it seems most intuitive that the S1 types should sell twice. A similar
argument applies to the S3 types: if they sell early and buy late (or vice-versa) they would
hold only one share while they could hold three.
For the S2 types, however, we have no prediction about the dynamic trading direction,
nor do we have an intuitive sense for how they should act in equilibrium with two trades.
They could trade in the same direction twice, following the crowd or acting against it.
Return trades, however, can also be rationalized since even taking a static view the S2
types can change their optimal action after observing different histories of trade. In our
analysis we will check if there is persistency in their behavior with respect to (static)
herding or contrarianism. Our experiment is thus an exploration of the strategic timing
of behavior.
Coming back to the timing of a second trade, we note that a second, same-direction
trade may be delayed. Since traders are not infinitesimal, their actions have a discrete
price impact. A trader who traded early may thus delay, hoping that the price reverts back
against the movement that the trader caused. If delay of the second trade is observed,
then it is also no longer clear that we should expect to find a significant difference between
the timing of second trades for S1 or S3 types and S2 types.
4 Experimental Design
Here we discuss the experimental design, focusing on the information provided to the
subjects, the differences between treatments, and the predictions made in advance. The
appendix contains further information including a time-line (Appendix B), a full set of
instructions and the material given to subjects (Appendix C), as well as a thorough
description of the purpose-built software used for this experiment (Appendix D).
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4.1 Overview
The design focused on a financial asset that can take one of three possible liquidation
values V ∈ {75, 100, 125} which correspond to the true value of the asset. The traders
were typically made up of 15-25 experimental subjects plus a further 25% of computerized
noise traders, with a central computer acting as the market maker.
Prior to each treatment each subject i received an informative private signal, Si ∈
S ∈ {S1, S2, S3}. They were also provided with an information sheet detailing the prior
probability of each state, and a list of what each possible signal would imply for the
probability of each state, and the likelihood of each signal being drawn given the state. In
other words, we provided both the signal distribution and the initial posterior distribution,
conditional on receiving a signal. The information on the sheet was common knowledge
to all subjects. In particular the subjects therefore should have realized that the quality
of the signal was ex post identical for all subjects. The subjects were not told anything
about the implications of U-shaped, hill-shaped or monotonic information structures or
the predictions of the theory.
The nature of the compensation system was also made very clear in advance, and in
particular that it directly implied that they should attempt to make the highest possible
virtual profit in each round, since the final compensation was based on overall perfor-
mance (in UK currency up to £25 combined with a one-off participation fee of £5, or the
equivalent in Canadian dollars).
The existence and proportion of noise traders was made known to the experimental
subjects in advance, who were also aware that noise traders randomized 50 : 50 between
buying and selling and that they trade at random times.
The subjects were informed that the sessions would last 3 minutes and that they would
receive announcements about the remaining time after 2:30 minutes, and 2:50 minutes.
We considered two classes of treatments: in the first people were allowed to trade once,
in the second they could trade twice. The software allowed subjects to trade only this
specific number of times. The sequence of transactions produced a history of actions and
prices, Ht with t ∈ (0, 3), that recorded the price, timing (in seconds) and direction of
each transaction. Subjects were shown the history in the form of a continuously updating
price chart during each treatment, and they were also given the current price, Pt. This
price was calculated by the computer as Pt = E [V |Ht] with P1 = 100.
Subjects were told that they had three possible actions a = {sell, pass, buy} which
they could undertake only during the 3 minutes of trading time. They were instructed
that pressing the ‘pass’-button would count as one of the actions that they were allowed.
It was stressed to the subjects that their virtual profits per treatment were generated
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based on the difference between the price at which they traded, Pt∗ where t
∗ is the time
of their personal trading opportunity, and the true value of the share, V .
The subjects themselves were recruited from the Universities of Toronto, Cambridge
and Warwick. No one was allowed to take part twice. We ran 13 sessions in all: 3 at
the University of Cambridge, 6 at the University of Warwick and 4 at the University of
Toronto. We collected demographic data only for the Warwick sessions: of the subjects
there, around 49% were female, around 73% were studying (or had already taken) degrees
in Economics, Finance, Business, Statistics, Management or Maths. 53% claimed to have
some prior experience of financial markets, with some 23% owning shares at some point
in the past.14
4.2 Treatments
Following Section 3, the rational action for S1 and S3 subject types was to sell or buy
respectively, irrespective of Ht, while for the S2 types the nature of Ht and the precise
information structure determined a unique optimal action. In the first three treatments,
subjects were allowed to trade at most once, in the last three treatments subjects were
allowed to trade at most twice. The treatments were each designed to enable us to examine
a specific information structure:15
Treatment 1: negative U-shaped signal structure making buy herding possible;
Treatment 2: negative hill-shape making buy-contrarianism possible;
Treatment 3: positive U-shaped signal structure making sell-herding possible;
Treatment 4: as Treatment 2 but with two trades;
Treatment 5: as Treatment 3 but with two trades;
Treatment 6: as Treatment 1 but with two trades.
Therefore under each treatment, once we knew the signals and trades, we could exactly
calculate the theoretically predicted static (or myopic) action for each subject; in some
cases this might be to herd or act in a contrarian way.
The endogenous-time treatments presented in this paper were run as part of a larger
set of experiments that involved the same computer software. Since subjects were exposed
14Appendix E details the questions asked in the questionnaire. When asked what motivated their
decisions (across different sessions) 44% of subjects mentioned a combination of prices and signals, 31%
only price, 18% only signal and the remaining 7% had other motivations. 38% thought that in general
the current price was more important than the signal, 36% thought the signal was more important than
the current price and the remaining 26% felt they were of similar value. Roughly 24% claimed to have
carried out numerical calculations.
15Since in Drehmann et al. (2005) the inclusion of transaction costs produced the expected outcomes,
we ignored transactions costs and instead focused on the information structure as the key differentiating
factor between treatments.
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to an example round, and the endogenous-time treatments were run last, subjects had
ample time to familiarize themselves with the software.
4.3 Theoretical Predictions
Single-Trade Case. Given the proximity of the design to the theoretical model outlined
in Section 3, several predictions arise immediately:
Hypothesis 1 S1 types sell as soon as the treatment starts, and S3 types buy as soon as
the treatment starts.
While we generally predict that the S1 and S3 types should trade immediately, we
would expect that the distribution of trades for the S1 and S3 types should be strongly
tilted towards time 0.
As described in Section 3 the S2 types’ behavior is a function of both the treatment
and history Ht. Specifically, from the S2 types, we expect to see possible herding behavior
in Treatments 1 and 3 and possible contrarianism in Treatment 2. More formally,
Hypothesis 2 S2 types herd and act as contrarians if only if the conditions for herding
and contrarianism are met.
Buy-herding is possible in Treatment 1 and sell-herding in Treatment 3. Therefore,
since we know the outcome of the random elements (noise trades and the signals for each
subject) and conditional on all other subjects behaving optimally, we can calculate which
action each subject should have undertaken given Ht and S, irrespective of the timing.
As stressed before, we have no theoretical prediction concerning the timing of the S2
types’ transactions. Following the discussion above, however, we conjecture that
Hypothesis 3 The S2 types will act later than the S1 and S3.
Hypothesis 4 Hill-shaped S2-types will act before U-shaped S2 types.
Two-Trade Case. For the cases with two transactions, we have no theoretical predic-
tions, even for the S1 and S3 types. However, we conjecture that
Hypothesis 5 S1 types sell twice and as soon as the treatment starts, and S3 types buy
twice and as soon as the treatment starts.
The optimal behavior of the S2 types is even more difficult to determine. In particular,
it is not clear whether the second trade should follow the first one immediately. Following
the discussion of the last section, we conjecture that
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Hypothesis 6 For the first trade the S2 types will act later than the S1 and S3 types.
Likewise, for the first trade hill-shaped S2 types will act before U-shaped S2 types.
If the S1 and S3 types do not perform their second trade immediately after their first
trade, then we do not have any prediction as to whether or not the S2 types should make
their second trade before or after the other two types.
Finally, it is worth comparing the treatments with one and two trades. When two
trades are allowed, since subjects know that people can trade more frequently, any delay
motive that they might possess will be diminished. Consequently, we would expect
Hypothesis 7 Trades in the two-unit trade treatments, T4-T6, should be earlier than in
the single trade treatments, T1-T3.
4.4 Behavioral, non-rational predictions for the static decision
If complexity is an issue, it would seem likely that S2 types are most likely to behave
irrationally because they have to take a history and signal dependent decision. So while
first hoping that the theory holds, a secondary hypothesis would be that if the theory
does not provide a full explanation of behavior then it should at least do a better job at
explaining the behavior of the S1 and S3 types than the S2 types.
There are various behavioral theories which contradict Bayesian updating, and we
also aim to examine whether, when and how any of these might explain any departures
from the standard theory which incorporates Bayesian rationality. We also consider the
influence of risk aversion on decision-making. Finally, price movements themselves might
influence decision-making through end-point effects, since subjects were told what the
possible state-values were in advance. Specifically, they know that values should not
exceed 125 or fall below 75. Further to this, they must realize that when prices approach
either extreme there is little to gain in buying at a price close to 125 or selling at a price
close to 75. Therefore, we might consider how actions will change as prices near their
extremes. While we predict that people trade earlier rather than later, when there is
delay, prices may affect the decision.
In summary, should Hypotheses 1 and 2 fail, we have several further, alternative
hypotheses that could be investigated. These are purposefully left as general as possible
with the aim of adding more detail during the analysis of the results.
Hypothesis 8 (Complexity) S2 types fail to act in accordance with prescribed optimal
actions when the decision is close.
Hypothesis 9 (Risk aversion) Subjects exhibit signs of risk aversion.
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Hypothesis 10 (Prospect theory) Subjects exhibit signs of loss aversion.
Hypothesis 11 (Prior expectation) Subjects do not update their beliefs at all as prices
change but act solely on the basis of their prior expectation.
Hypothesis 12 (Probability Shifting) Subjects update their beliefs on the basis of
changing prices at a slower rate than they should.
Hypothesis 13 (Error Correction) Subjects account for errors that some of their peers
make systematically and they react rationally to these errors.
Note that Hypotheses 11-13 are similar: in all cases updating is slowed down. For
instance, if a subject incorrectly believes that there are more noise traders than specified,
then subjects would deliberately slow down their own updating process.
We have also left the hypotheses unconstrained where a specific variable is important,
so we can calibrate to the data. For example, in Hypothesis 12 we have purposefully
left the degree to which subjects might engage in probability shifting unstated so we can
examine this for various different values; similarly for Hypothesis 13. Needless to say, by
taking the value that allows each hypothesis to perform best, we can more easily rule out
any hypotheses if they still provide an inadequate description of behavior. Furthermore,
for reasons of parsimony, should a behavioral theory perform no better than the Bayes
rational theory, we thereby have a presumption to favor the later.
5 Analysis of the Static Trade-Direction Decision
We will first examine the results by summary statistics and then expand on them with a
formal econometric analysis in Section 6.
In the numbers to follow we exclude noise trades, and focus only on trades by human
subjects. The total number of trades was 1993 spread over all 6 treatments; broken up by
trader type we have 623 (S1), 786 (S2) and 584 (S3). For T1-T3 we had 683 trades (197
S1, 276 S2 and 210 S3), for T4-T6 there were 1310 (426 S1, 510 S2 and 374 S3) trades.
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5.1 The Decision to Pass
Before we discuss the general fit of behavior towards the theoretical model, we need to
consider the decision to ‘pass’. Under rationality, traders should buy if their conditional
16We had data on 23 additional trades from one treatment in one session that were excluded from the
analysis due to computer error.
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expectation exceeds the ask price and sell otherwise. Thus passes contradict the theoret-
ical model.
That being said, the structure of our setup lends some additional meaning to passes.
Traders are owners of a share and they have the choice to buy an extra share, or to sell
the share that they already own.17 The third possibility, passing, implies that they hold
on to that share, presumably in hope of making a profit on that one share. In this sense,
a hold is a positive signal albeit weaker than a buy, so that a pass can be counted as a
“weak buy”.
Overall there were 99 passes (< 5% of all trades), 26 from S1 types (4% of S1 trades);
52 from S2 types (7%) and 21 from S3 types (4%). While the theoretical model predicts
that we should see no passes at all, we do see some; one explanation for the presence of
passes could be risk aversion, and we will comment on this interpretation at length below.
The total number of passes is very small; as a percentage of trades, passes occur much
less frequently than in our exogenous timing companion project.
5.2 Overview of the fit of the data to the rational model
Let us start with a rough overview of decisions that are in line with rationality, as aggre-
gated over all treatments.
The number of trades contradicting the theoretical model was about 30% when count-
ing passes as categorically incorrect. Now suppose we admit that passes may be ‘weak
buys’. Then all passes by S1 types are still irrational, whereas all passes by S3 types
are admitted as rational. For the S2 types, passes are admitted as rational whenever the
rational action was to ‘buy’.
Examining Hypotheses 1 and 2, we note that the number of trades that conformed to
the theoretical predictions was 70% treating passes as suboptimal and 73% if passes are
admitted as ‘weak buys’. These numbers are similar to those in Cipriani and Guarino
(2005) who obtain 73% rationality, or Anderson and Holt (1997) who have 70% rationality,
albeit with a fixed-price setting. Our own companion paper, Park and Sgroi (2008), with
exogenous timing displayed a 70%/75% fit. This similarity to the results in the literature
is noteworthy because the setting in our experiment is much more complex. Moreover,
the Cipriani and Guarino (2005) experiment effectively considers only types that are
equivalent to our S1 and S3 types. Our traders of these types actually performed better
than those in Cipriani and Guarino, with rationality in excess of 80%. We might thus
reasonably argue that the S1 and S3 types are acting in accordance with the rational
static theory.
17Our rationale for this specification was to avoid explaining short-selling to subjects.
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Rational model Rational model
without passes with passes
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1, negative U-shape correct 58 22 64 58 23 66
wrong 3 63 16 3 62 14
% correct 95% 26% 80% 95% 27% 83%
Treatment 2, negative hill-shape 47 66 61 47 70 61
13 33 9 13 29 9
78% 67% 87% 78% 71% 87%
Treatment 3, positive U-shape 66 44 49 66 55 54
10 48 11 10 37 6
87% 48% 82% 87% 60% 90%
Treatment 4, negative hill-shape 127 104 97 127 107 104
25 43 24 25 40 17
84% 71% 80% 84% 73% 86%
Treatment 5, positive U-shape 123 106 99 123 116 101
30 77 7 30 67 5
80% 58% 93% 80% 63% 95%
Treatment 6, negative U-shape 103 47 114 103 57 119
18 133 33 18 123 28
85% 26% 78% 85% 32% 81%
Total 524 389 484 524 428 505
T1-T3 171 132 174 171 148 181
T4-T6 353 257 310 353 280 324
Total% 84% 49% 83% 84% 54% 86%
T1-T3% 87% 48% 83% 87% 54% 86%
T4-T6% 83% 50% 83% 83% 55% 87%
Overall 70% 73%
Table 1: Fit of the data to the rational, static model.
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missing herds/ missing herds/
contra w/o pass contra w pass
T1 (U-negative) 61/82 (74%) 60/82 (73%)
T2 (hill) 10/28 (21%) 6/28 (21%)
T3 (U-positive) 4/4 (100%) 3/4 (75%)
T4 (hill) 8/27 (30%) 5/27 (19%)
T5 (U-positive) 12/16 (75%) 12/16 (75%)
T6 (U-negative) 128/173 (74%) 118/173 (68%)
Total% realized 32% 38%
Herding% realized 25% 30%
Contrarian% realized 67% 80%
Table 2: Missing herding and contrarian trades split up by treatment.
The S2 types, however, often do not act rationally — almost half of their trades were
against the rational model. In particular in the herding Treatments 1 and 6, the S2 do
quite poorly, even when admitting passes as weak buys. Had they taken each action at
random they would have done better.18
At the same time, the S2 types face a more difficult decision problem than the S1 and
S3 types. Theoretically, the decisions of the S1 and S3 types never change, so they can
take the correct decision even without following the history carefully. The S2 types on
the other hand, have to follow the history carefully and small mis-computations can cause
them to be categorized as irrational.
5.3 Herding and Contrarianism
In Section 2 we have defined herding and contrarian behavior. There is a difference,
however, between theoretically mandated herding and experimentally observed herding
(and contrarian behavior): according to the theoretical model, a trader buys only if his
expectation exceeds the ask price. Thus theoretically mandated, rational herd behavior
arises whenever a trader’s initial expectation is below the price, his time-t expectation is
above the price, and prices have risen.
Since we can compute the theoretical expectations at any stage, we know when herding
or contrarian behavior is theoretically mandated, at least from the static optimization
perspective (again we note that the dynamic strategies may look different). Herding and
contrarian behavior can be classified either excluding passes or including passes as ‘weak
buys’; we look at both cases separately.
18In the formal econometric analysis of the next section we will see that there is some persistency to
their behavior.
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Number of herds Number of contrarians
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
T1 3 5% 23 28% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 14 21%
U-negative 60 83 0 0 0 67
T2 5 13% 22 27% 3 10% 8 47% 20 67% 6 24%
hill 40 83 30 17 30 25
T3 8 11% 2 17% 0 0% 2 67% 32 43% 6 16%
U-positive 70 12 17 3 74 38
T4 17 13% 32 28% 2 4% 8 40% 22 73% 15 24%
hill 128 115 47 20 30 63
T5 25 18% 5 25% 0 0% 5 63% 54 35% 5 6%
U-positive 139 20 15 8 156 84
T6 17 15% 50 29% 0 0% 1 33% 0 0% 28 23%
U-negative 116 175 10 3 2 124
Total 75 134 5 24 128 74
T1-T3 16 47 3 10 52 26
T4-T6 59 87 2 14 76 48
Total% 14% 27% 4% 47% 44% 18%
T1-T3% 9% 26% 6% 50% 50% 20%
T4-T6% 15% 28% 3% 45% 40% 18%
Table 3: Herding and contrarian trades for all traders by treatment. The second
row entries list the number of possible herding trades. For instance, for the S3 herding
is only possible if prices fell. We report only the figures for which passes are counted as
‘weak buys’.
Herding and Contrarianism in the strict sense: only (static) rational behavior
is considered. Table 2 summarizes our findings here. Looking only at the cases when
herding is theoretically mandated we see that, if we include passes as weak buys, rational
herding occurs only in 38% of the cases when it should. If we count passes as irrational,
the fit is even worse with only 32% of herds occurring when they should.
The fit for contrarian behavior is better (67% when passes are wrong, 80% when passes
are weak buys). The table also indicates that there are only very few rationally required
contrarian trades and there are only very few rationally required herding trades for the
case of U-positive signals. The reason is that both cases require that prices fall — and
this generally did not happen very often.
Herding and Contrarianism in the loose sense: irrational herding is allowed.
As argued above, the S2 types face a computationally difficult decision. We thus ask now
if the S2 types at least exhibit herding and contrarian behavior “in the right direction”,
we apply the herding/contrarianism definition without looking at private expectations.
So we ask, for instance, do they switch from selling to buying if prices rise and do they
switch from buying to selling if prices fall? Of course, while theoretically only S2 types can
rationally herd, irrational herding and contrarianism can now be observed for all types.
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Table 3 gives the raw numbers for these scenarios. When including passes, herding
arises in about 18% of the cases where it is possible, contrarian behavior arises in 33%
of the possible cases. Breaking these up by trader types, one can see that S2 types have
the highest propensity to herd — 27% including passes as weak buys. While there are
relatively more S1 types that act as contrarians than S2 types (47% vs. 44%), the number
of possible contrarian trades for the S1 types is also small. Our formal regression number
analysis will later show that as predicted the hill-shaped signal S2 is the major cause for
contrarianism.
Notably, the fraction of S2 type herders is larger than that observed in Drehmann et
al (2005) or Cipriani and Guarino (2005), where herding was generally irrational. Our
formal econometric analysis in the next section will confirm that the U-shaped signal is
the significant cause for herding behavior relative to all other types of signals.
6 Regression Analysis of the Static Decision
The summary statistics from the last section gave a good idea of the determinants of
behavior: first, theoretically predicted herding does not arise as often as mandated by the
theory. Second, when applying the looser experimental definition, recipients of middle
signals are more likely to herd than recipients of the extreme signals. Third, contrarian
behavior both according to the theoretical definition and the experimental definition is
observed and occurs more frequently than herding.
We now take a closer look and run several regressions to test the direct impact of
herding and contrarian signals relative to incidences of herding and contrarian trades. In
particular we ask the following questions:
(1) Given that someone has a herding signal (aka a U-shaped signal), is this person
more likely to herd than someone who does not have the U-shaped signal?
(2) Given that someone has a contrarian signal (aka a hill-shaped signal), is this person
more likely to act as a contrarian than someone who does not have the U-shaped signal?
The random assignment of signals to traders and time slots allows us to interpret
mean differences in signal-specific effects as outcomes as the average causal effects of the
signal. Formally, we estimate the following equation to test the hypothesis that a type of
signal, specifically U-shaped or hill shaped, is a significant cause for herding or contrarian
behavior respectively:
herdi,t = α+ βu-shapei,t + fixedi + ǫi,t, contrai,t = α+ βhill-shapei,t + fixedi + ǫi,t (1)
where the dependent variables herdi,t and contrai,t are dummies that apply Definition 1
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in the sense that they are set equal to 1 if individual i herds or acts as a contrarian
respectively at trade t and 0 otherwise, α is a constant, and u-shapei,t and hill-shapei,t
are signal dummies that are set equal to 1 if the individual received a U-shaped (for
the herding estimation) or hill-shaped (for the contrarian estimation) signal. Parameter
fixedi is an individual fixed effect that controls for specific traders who persistently err.
Given the random assignment of signals, we can assume that E[u-shapei,t · ǫi,t] = 0 and
E[hill-shapei,t · ǫi,t] = 0, the main identifying assumptions.
Overall, we restrict attention to the cases of trades where herding and contrarianism
respectively are at all possible. This is reasonable since, for instance, when prices rise and
a trader has signal S3, then such a trader cannot herd because none of his actions would
satisfy the definition of herding.
We ran these regressions on a total of 10 different subsets of the data: we ran the
regressions for all treatments, for treatments T1-T3 (one trade), for T4-T6 (two trades),
for the first trade in T4-T6, and for the second trade in T4-T6. For these five subsets
we looked at the situation where all types are included and those where only the S2
types were included. In each scenario we estimated the model by logit and ordinary least
squares regressions without fixed effects (i.e. γi is omitted from (1)) and then ran OLS
controlling for trader fixed effects. All regressions included a constant which is significant
at all conventional levels but omitted from the results tables. As a general convention we
report standard errors in parentheses and a ∗ indicates significance at the 5% level, ∗∗
signifies significance at the 1% level.
Herding. In this specification, β represents the impact of the signal on individuals’
choices of whether or not to herd, and should be positive if, as dictated by the theory, the
U-shaped signal increases the probability of herding. If the inclusion of the fixed effects
parameter fixedi alters the coefficients or the significance of estimates, then this indicates
that the results are driven by specific individuals.
Tables 4 and 5 summarize the results from our regression. Overall, obtaining a U-
shaped signal S2 increases the probability of herding by about 29% relative to any other
signal and it is significant with and without controlling for trader fixed effects; moreover,
the coefficients from the logit and OLS regression are similar. Among the S2 types, this
probability remains about the same at 30.5%. This estimate is significantly different from
zero at conventional levels for all subsamples with the exception of the T1-T3 trades
when focusing on S2 types trades only. Including trader-fixed effect decreases the OLS
coefficients only slightly; this indicates that the estimates are not driven by some specific
traders who persistently take no-herding actions.
Overall the regression confirms the hypothesis that recipients of S2 herding-type signals
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are generally more likely to herd. The effect of the signal is also much stronger than that
in the comparable exogenous timing setting: in our companion paper Park and Sgroi
(2008) we find a marginal effect of about 6%.
To obtain a complete picture, we also estimated
herdi,t = α+ β2u-shapei,t + β1S1 signal i,t + β3S3 signal i,t + ǫi,t (2)
where variables S1 signali,t and S3 signali,t are dummies for signals S1 and S3. Estimated
by OLS this yields coefficients βˆ2 = .278
∗∗(.034) on herd-signals, βˆ1 = −.110
∗∗(.031) on
S1 and βˆ3 = −.163
∗∗(.043) on S3. So obtaining the herding signal strongly increases the
chance of acting as a herder, and the probability of herding decreasing for all other signals.
Contrarianism. Next, we estimate equation (1) to test the hypothesis that a hill-
shaped signal is a significant explanation of contrarian behavior. Our theory predicts that
the coefficient β is positive so that a hill-shaped signal indeed has a larger impact on the
occurrence of contrarianism relative to other kinds of signals.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the results from our regression. Obtaining the hill-shaped S2
signal increases the chance of acting as a contrarian by about 36.1% relative to any other
kind of signal as the marginal effect at the mean. As with herding, the OLS coefficient
changes only slightly when we include trader fixed effects. All coefficients are significant
at the 1% level. When restricting attention to the sample of S2 types the marginal effect
decreases slightly to 31%, and OLS and marginal logit estimates coincide. All coefficients
are significant at the 1% level except for the T1-T3 subsample of S2 types trades, where we
have significance at the 5% level (due to the large standard error). Including fixed effects
renders the coefficient insignificant for the second trades, restricted to only S2 types; this
is again due to the small number of relevant data points and the large standard error that
is involved.
Overall we confirm that the hill-shaped signal is the significant source of contrarianism
relative to all other signals. The marginal effect is comparable to that in the exogenous
time setting (Park and Sgroi (2008)), which is estimated to be about 34%.
As with herding, to obtain a complete picture, we also estimated
contrai,t = α+ β2hill-shapei,t + β1S1 signal i,t + β3S3 signal i,t + ǫi,t. (3)
Coefficients here are βˆ2 = .312
∗∗ (.060) for the hill-shaped signal dummy, βˆ1 = −.0414
(.065) (insignificant at all conventional levels) for the signal S1 dummy and βˆ3 = −.191
∗∗
(.033) for the S3 dummy. So again, the hill-shaped S2 signal is clearly identified as the
major cause of contrarianism.
22 Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
all types T1-T3 T4-T6 first trades second trade
T4-T6 T4-T6
Logit 0.292** 0.114** 0.397** 0.228** 0.446**
(-0.022) (-0.032) (-0.032) (-0.025) (-0.05)
OLS 0.378** 0.138** 0.495** 0.293** 0.552**
(-0.025) (-0.039) (-0.031) (-0.03) (-0.043)
OLS fixed 0.352** 0.081 0.434** 0.276** 0.545**
effects (-0.027) (-0.042) (-0.038) (-0.032) (-0.057)
Observations 1172 391 781 805 367
R2 OLS 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.11 0.31
R2 fixed 0.39 0.67 0.52 0.40 0.74
Table 4: The Effect of U-Shaped Signals on the Probability of Herding. The table represents
regressions of the occurrence of a herding trade on the trader receiving a U-shaped signal. Logit regres-
sions report the marginal effects. OLS fixed effects regressions control for trader-fixed effects. The data
is restricted to include only trades that could be herding trades. Standard errors are in parentheses, * in-
dicates significance at the 5% level, ** at the 1% level.
7 The Impact of the Price
While the general behavior of the S1 and S3 types is in line with the theoretical static
model (over 80% of their traders are ‘rational’), we do observe that S3 types engage in
selling and that S1 types engage in buying. We now want to assess if this behavior is
systematic. Specifically, we test whether an increase in the price changes the probability
of a specific trade. Theoretically, the price should have no impact on the decision because
S1 types should always sell and S3 types should always buy. We therefore estimate the
following regression
tradei,t = α+ β∆pricei,t + ǫt, (4)
where tradei,t is a dummy that is 1 if there is a buy or hold, and 0 when there is a sale, and
the independent variable ∆pricei,t is the percentage change of the price from 100, i.e. the
price at the time of the trade divided by 100 and subtracting 1.19 Considering the optimal
static decision at the time at which people trade we assert that E[∆pricei,t · ǫi,t] = 0.
We estimated the model by logit separately for the three signals. The main variable
of interest in (4) is β which measures whether a rising price affects the probability of
a trader buying or selling. Our static theory predicts that the price should have no
impact on whether an S1 or S3 type buys or sells. Consequently, parameter β should
be insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, if it is not zero, then we gain insights
19We ran two unreported control regressions: in the first, we dropped all holds, and in the second,
we estimated a specification in which buys received value 2, holds 1 and sales 0 (this specification was
estimated using a multinomial logit). The direction of the results and the significance of the coefficients
remained unaffected.
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only S2 T1-T3 T4-T6 first trades second trade
T4-T6 T4-T6
Logit 0.305** 0.035 0.446** 0.194** 0.565**
(-0.049) (-0.066) (-0.066) (-0.055) (-0.104)
OLS 0.284** 0.034 0.406** 0.186** 0.493**
(-0.044) (-0.066) (-0.054) (-0.052) (-0.075)
OLS fixed 0.315** 0.031 0.409** 0.236** 0.591**
effects (-0.055) (-0.069) (-0.081) (-0.071) (-0.123)
Observations 481 166 315 330 151
R-squared OLS 0.08 0 0.15 0.04 0.22
R-squared Fixed 0.47 0.91 0.61 0.55 0.89
Table 5: The Effect of U-Shaped Signals on the Probability of Herding, only S2 types. The
table represents regressions of the occurrence of a herding trade on the trader receiving a U-shaped signal.
Logit regressions report the marginal effects. OLS fixed effects regressions control for trader-fixed effects.
The data is restricted to include only trades that could be herding trades and that are made by S2 types.
about systematic herding or contrarian behavior. For instance, consider type S3. If the
sign of β is negative, then this type becomes less likely to buy as prices increase. Such
behavior tentatively indicates systematic contrarian behavior. Likewise, if β were positive
for the S1 type, then this implies that the S1 types are more likely to buy when prices
rise; this is a tentative herding effect.
For the S2 types, however, there should be an effect, the sign depending on the shape
of the signal distribution. Specifically, for a hill-shaped signal distribution, the S2 type
should become less likely to buy as the price increases (for prices above 100, the coefficient
should be zero), for a negative U-shaped distribution the probability should be increasing
in the price, and for a positive U-shaped distribution it should be increasing (for low
prices, this type should be sell-herding).
Table 8 summarizes the results of our estimation, Table 9 splits up the S2 trades by
signal type.
We find that for all types of signals, an increase in the price decreases the chance that
the trader buys: all estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This is
contrary to the theory for the S1 and S3 types who should always be selling and buying
respectively, irrespective of the price. While the sign of the estimate for the hill-shaped
type has the right sign, the sign is wrong for the U-shaped types. This is, of course, not
surprising, given that even the S3 types (the high types) act in a contrarian manner, so
it is reasonable to expect the same behavior from the S2 types.
24 Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
all types T1-T3 T4-T6 first trades second trade
T4-T6 T4-T6
Logit 0.361** 0.304** 0.419** 0.358** 0.371**
(-0.056) (-0.081) (-0.082) (-0.064) (-0.114)
OLS 0.434** 0.353** 0.508** 0.439** 0.429**
(-0.057) (-0.085) (-0.079) (-0.066) (-0.114)
OLS fixed 0.406** 0.300* 0.473** 0.405** 0.655**
effects (-0.063) (-0.117) (-0.108) (-0.076) (-0.177)
Observations 820 293 527 553 267
R-squared OLS 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
R-squared Fixed 0.41 0.67 0.52 0.51 0.79
Table 6: The Effect of Hill-Shaped Signals on the Probability of Acting as a Contrarian. The
table represents regressions of the occurrence of a contrarian trade on the trader receiving a hill-shaped
signal. Logit regressions report the marginal effects. Fixed effects regressions control for trader-fixed
effects. The data is restricted to include only trades that could be classified as contrarian.
8 The relation between the first and the second trade
People have the opportunity to make so-called ‘return’ trades by sell first and then buying
later or vice versa. This way, they can realize a trading profit in the process. At the same
time, if they make such a ‘return’ trade then by the end of the treatment they still own
one unit of the security.
Table 10 provides summary statistics for the second trade with emphasis on the return
trades (recall that return trades arise only in T4-T6).
Not all traders act twice — in about 6% of cases they forego the second trading
opportunity. About 76% of all second trades go in the same direction of the first. The
remaining 24% are return trades, most of which are performed by the S2 types. The
S2 also account for the largest fraction of all type-specific trades (33% of all S2 second
trades, 19% and 16% for the S1 and S3 types respectively). About 77% of the return
trades yield a trading profit which suggests that return-trades were performed on the
basis of “buy low, sell high” (or “sell high, buy low”). Now suppose we account also for
expected payoffs, i.e. we employ the expected static profit of a share at the time of each
trade. With this measure, only 49% of the return trades are profitable and the S2 types
do particularly poorly.
This raises the question of whether there are systematic features of the return trades.20
20In some unreported regressions we analyzed whether the payoffs from return trades are smaller when
they occur late. For this we regressed factual payoffs from return trades and also expected payoffs from
return trades on the trading time. Yet we found no significant relation and thus concluded that time has
no impact on the payoff of return trades. Moreover, we also could find no general relationship between
return trades and time for the S2 and S3 types. However, for the S1 types we found a relationship that is
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only S2 T1-T3 T4-T6 first trades second trade
T4-T6 T4-T6
Logit 0.313** 0.213* 0.402** 0.323** 0.300*
-0.074 -0.108 -0.108 -0.087 -0.145
OLS 0.312** 0.213* 0.394** 0.324** 0.292*
-0.069 -0.105 -0.094 -0.081 -0.134
OLS fixed 0.227* 0 0.343 0.224* 0.667
effects -0.096 -0.113 -0.19 -0.111 -0.43
Observations 305 110 195 208 97
R-squared OLS 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.05
R-squared Fixed 0.62 0.96 0.61 0.82 0.97
Table 7: The Effect of Hill-Shaped Signals on the Probability of Acting as a Contrarian. The
table represents regressions of the occurrence of a contrarian trade on the trader receiving a hill-shaped
signal. Logit regressions report the marginal effects. Fixed effects regressions control for trader-fixed
effects. The data is restricted to include only trades that could be classified as contrarian and that are
made by S2 types.
Return trades are always either buy-sell or sell-buy. So we ask if is there a particular
fashion in which the different signal types perform their return trades.
There is a specific interpretation that can be attached to return trades: for the S1 types
a buy-sell return trade has a manipulative connotation in that this type may try to drive
up the price so that he can sell high later-on; similarly for sell-buy return trades by the
S3 types. The reverse order is either contrarian or herding, where the difference between
contrarianism and herding is determined by the general movement of prices. However, for
the S2 types it is not clear how one would classify manipulative behavior with the order
of buys and sells. To get to the bottom of the common direction and the connotation, we
ran the following regressions
herdi,t = α+ βreturn tradei,t + ǫi,t, contrai,t = α+ βreturn tradei,t + ǫi,t, (5)
where the dependent variables herdi,t and contrai,t are the herding and contrarian dummies
from equations (1), α is a constant, and return tradei,t is a dummy for the incidence of a
return trade.
In each scenario we estimated the model by logit, restricted for the individual sig-
nals and the incidences of the second trades; we report the marginal effects. Table 11
summarizes our findings.
significant at the 1%-level. This finding is intuitive in the context of a different finding (which we report
below) in that the S1 types tend to act as herders when they perform a return trade. This implies that
the S1 types first sold, then waited and observed that prices were increasing. They then bought back the
share that they sold.
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logit OLS OLS fixed
S1 ∆price -1.287** -1.317** -1.303**
(-0.193) (-0.204) (-0.232)
Constant -0.110** 0.271** 0.270**
(-0.016) (-0.022) (-0.023)
Observations 623 623 623
R-squared 0.06 0.5
S2 ∆price -3.381** -2.850** -3.301**
(-0.322) (-0.23) (-0.268)
Constant 0.208** 0.678** 0.711**
(-0.03) (-0.023) (-0.024)
Observations 786 786 786
R-squared 0.16 0.5
S3 ∆price -1.299** -1.681** -1.210**
(-0.159) (-0.192) (-0.237)
Constant 0.260** 0.945** 0.922**
(-0.015) (-0.016) (-0.017)
Observations 583 583 583
R-squared 0.12 0.5
Table 8: The decision to buy as a function of the price. The table displays the results from a logit
regression of the decision to buy on the price change, as measured relative to the prior, (pt − 100)/100,
for all S1, S2 and S3 types respectively. For all traders the probability of a buy is decreasing as the price
rises.
Overall we observe that S1 types act as herders and the S3 types act as contrarians.
For the S2 types we observe a negative herding coefficient (significant at the 5% level) and
a positive contrarian coefficient (significant at the 1% level). Thus the likelihood of a S2
type herding trade is reduced by the incidence of a return trade and instead, an incidence
of a return trade increases the probability that the trade is contrarian.
9 Analysis of Timing
As outlined in our discussion in Section 3, there is little theory to guide our analysis
of subjects’ timing decisions; Hypotheses 1 to 7 formulate those assertions that we feel
comfortable making.
The strongest interpretation of the theory is that S1 and S3 types should trade imme-
diately when the session starts. Consequently, according to this view we should observe
that all these types trade within the first few seconds of the game. And indeed, we do
observe a very large number of trades at the very beginning of trading. Overall, the S1
and S3 types account for 1206 transactions. Within the first few seconds of trading we
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U-negative Hill U-Positive
∆price -1.632** -2.706** -4.060**
(-0.576) (-0.404) (-0.73)
Constant -0.012 0.129** 0.330**
(-0.059) (-0.048) (-0.035)
Observations 266 245 275
Table 9: The decision to buy as a function of the price for the S2 types. The table displays
the results from a logit regressing the decision to buy on the price change, as measured relative to the
prior, for the S2 types split up by signal-type.
S1 S2 S3 All
Total trades 425 510 373 1308
First trades 222 262 190 674
Second trades 203 248 183 634
Return trades 39 82 29 150
Same direction 164 166 154 484
Forgone second trade 19 14 7 40
Percent return 19% 33% 16% 24%
Percent return of all trades 9% 16% 8% 11%
Percent foregone 9% 5% 4% 6%
Profitable return 32 64 19 115
Percent profitable return 82% 78% 66% 77%
Profitable return including expectations 23 29 21 73
Percent profitable return including expectations 59% 35% 72% 49%
Table 10: Return Trades.
observe the following number of transactions (note that the smallest time unit that our
software supports is a second).
<1 sec. 1 sec. 2 sec. 3 sec. 4 sec. 5 sec.
Number of trades 131 111 90 72 51 57
by S1 28 46 30 37 21 16
by S3 72 30 30 13 12 20
Overall, 355 out of the 1206 trades made by S1 and S3 types occur within the first five
seconds. Yet while this number is substantial, it is less than 30% of the trades, and so we
cannot support the hypothesis that all of the S1 and S3 types trade immediately.
We now attempt to identify systematic differences in the timing behavior for the var-
ious signal types and treatment settings. Specifically, we will compare the cumulative
distributions of the trade-times for different categories of types. The strongest result that
one can hope for in this context is that one cumulative distribution function (henceforth,
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S1 S2 S3
herding case 0.085** -0.129*
(-0.028) (-0.066)
contrarian case 0.181** 0.312**
(-0.039) (-0.064)
Constant for herding case -0.166** -0.128**
(-0.028) (-0.03)
Constant for contrarian case -0.276** -0.252**
(-0.017) (-0.027)
Observations 205 248 182
Table 11: Trade-Direction of Return Trades. The table condenses six regressions
(by type and then with respect to herding and contrarian behavior separately). For the
S1 types there was no simultaneous occurrence of contrarian behavior and return trades;
similarly for the S3 types and herding behavior. Hence the empty cells.
cdf) of trade-times stochastically dominates another: distribution F first order stochas-
tically dominates distribution G if G is larger than F for all entry times. If we indeed
observe that F first order stochastically dominates G, then we can say that the entry
times under F are systematically later than under G.
Figure 1 provides plots of the relevant cdfs. Specifically, we computed the cdfs for the
following subsamples:
D1 all treatments, separated by types S1, S2, S3,
D2 T1-T3 and first trades in T4-T6, separated by types S1, S2, S3,
D3 T1-T3 separated by types S1, S2, S3,
D4 T4-T6 separated by types S1, S2, S3,
D5 T4-T6 first trades, separated by types S1, S2, S3
D6 T4-T6 second trades, separated by types S1, S2, S3
D7 T1-T3 not separated by types
D8 T4-T6 not separated by types
D9 T4-T6 first trades only, not separated by types
D10 all treatments, only for S2, separated by hill, U-negative and U-positive
D11 T1-T3 and first trades in T4-T6, only for S2, separated by hill,
U-negative, and U-positive
We will now address the systematic timing issues by referring to the above sets of distri-
butions.
Question 1: Which type acts earliest, which latest? To answer this, we compared the
timing-cdfs split up by types. All panels in Figure 1 save for the bottom row, right panel
29 Financial Trading Experiment with Endogenous Timing
are very clear: the S1 and S3 are indistinguishable, and the S2 trade after the S1 and
S3 because the S2 type’s distribution of entry times is below the entry time distribution
for the S1 and S3. Specifically, this holds for all treatments D1, for all first trades D2,
for treatments T1-T3, T4-T6, and for the first trades only in T4-T6. Consequently our
findings comply with Smith (2000)’s prediction that people with good-news or bad-news-
signals trade early, and that people who receive mixed information delay.
Question 2: Is there a timing order for the second trade? The bottom row, right panel
in Figure 1 indicates that there is no timing relation between the three types when it
comes to the second trade. This non-finding suggests that settings in which people can
trade more than once would likely not yield clear insights with respect to people’s timing
behavior.
Question 3: Will people trade faster when they can trade more often? To answer this
question we compare D7 to D8 and D7 to D9. The left and middle panels in Figure 2 again
paint a clear picture. Allowing people to trade more often speeds up their trade-times in
particular when looking only at the first trade in T4-T6.
Question 4: For the S2, which type of signal will trade earliest, which latest? To
answer this question we regard the cdfs in D10 and D11; Figure 3 visualizes these cdfs.
Again, the picture here is clear: recipients of the hill-shaped signal act earliest, whereas
recipients of the U-positive signal act last.
In Section 3 we argued that one may expect to see the hill-shaped types act before
the U-shaped type since they would generally act against the general movement of prices.
However, note that when prices rise such trades are not contrarian trades as they are in
line with the original, slightly negative opinion.
In summary, the S2 types act systematically after the S1 and S3 types, and the hill-
shaped types act before the U-shaped types.
Clustering. One significant feature observed during the experiment is that trades are
often clustered. We have already explained that many, though not all, trades occur at the
very beginning of the treatment. There also appears to be leader-follower trading in the
sense that when one trade occurs, others follow in very quick succession. This suggests
that people wait for someone to make a move with the intention of immediately reacting
with a trade.
To get a sense of systematic behavior, we first determined the number of seconds
between one trade and its predecessor. We then looked at the frequencies for which
trades occur within 1.5 seconds of one another, split up by signal types. Table 12 lists
the relevant percentages, Figure 4 plots the frequencies for the case where all signal types
are taken together.
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As can be seen, there are a large number of trades that occur within 1.5 seconds of
each other; the concentration is strongest at the very beginning of the treatment and
changes only very little as the treatment progresses. The concentration at the beginning
is no surprise as about 25% of all trades occur within the first 5 seconds (it takes another
25 seconds before a total of 50% of trades are made).21 The table also illustrates that
there is no measurable variation among types; unreported regressions confirm this insight.
We thus confirm that there is a general tendency to trade in a clustered manner, though
signals have no impact on the clustering.
All S1 S2 S3 hill −ve U +ve U
All times 67% 66% 63% 71% 64% 66% 61%
total time >5 sec 58% 56% 57% 62% 57% 60% 55%
total time >10 sec 54% 52% 53% 58% 55% 55% 50%
total time >20 sec 51% 48% 51% 55% 56% 50% 49%
total time >30 sec 50% 44% 50% 54% 56% 49% 46%
Table 12: Clustering of Trades: The percentage of trades that follow within 1.5 seconds of
another.
10 Conclusion
Herding has long been suspected to play a role in financial market booms and busts.
Recent theoretical work shows that informational herding (or contrarianism) is possible
in a market with efficient asset prices if the conditional signal distribution for traders
has a specific shape. To keep this theory tractable one needs strong assumptions such
as an exogenous entry order. Having explored financial market herding with exogenous
timing elsewhere, we address how behavior changes when traders can choose the time
of their trade. Giving traders a choice of when to act is not only natural, but there
are also important insights that can be gleaned from such an analysis. For instance, if
herding-prone types delay their actions systematically, then herd behavior can become
more pronounced and significant compared to exogenous timing settings.
We thus examined the results of an experimental test involving almost 2000 trades,
exploring people’s behavior when they can not only choose how to trade, but also when to
trade. By contrast with almost all existing experiments, we employ a theoretical frame-
work that allows rational herding and contrarianism in a financial market environment
with moving prices.
21The results are similar when looking at the trades in intervals, e.g. those that occur between 20 and
40 seconds etc.
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Figure 1: Plots for the timing cdfs by signal types and treatments.
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Figure 2: Plots for the timing cdfs by number of trades.
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Figure 4: Plots for the time-difference pdfs.
We found that subjects’ decisions were generally in line with the predictions of exogenous-
time financial herding theory when that theory admits rational herding and contrarianism.
While herding and contrarianism do not arise as frequently as predicted by theory, types
theoretically prone to herd or be contrarian are the significant source of this kind of behav-
ior when it does arise. Moreover, compared to an exogenous timing setting, the herding
signal has a much larger impact on the likelihood of a herding action.
Types with extreme information (good or bad) trade systematically earliest, and those
with signals conducive to contrarianism trade earlier than those with information con-
ducive to herding. We thus find strong evidence for the impact of the type of information
both with respect to the direction and the timing of trades.
Finally, examining alternative models of behavior (such as risk aversion, loss aversion
or probability shifting) leaves us with the impression that most of these specifications
either perform poorly or add little to our understanding over and above the risk-neutral
rational model. Moreover since alternative theories often require additional parameters,
for reasons of parsimony our presumption remains in favor of the standard model of
Bayesian rationality. The exception are models of behavior which essentially result in
subjects putting too much weight on their own information or equivalently slowing down
their updating, which can partially explain why fewer herding or contrarian trades occur
in practice than predicted by the rational theory.
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A Alternative Explanations for Trading Behavior
We have seen in Section 5 that some results are supportive of the static theory, confirmed
by a formal regression analysis in Section 6. Yet it is also well-established in experimental
work, that models with Bayesian rationality and risk-neutral agents may not provide the
best fit for the data.
The general assumption of our model is that people are risk-neutral. As a first check we
will see if this assumption is warranted. Next, we will analyze if loss-aversion may play a
role in people’s behavior. Finally we will check if various forms of alternative information
updating provide a better fit with the data. These approaches usually depend on some
parameter(s). Our approach is to vary this parameter and see how the variation improves
the overall fit of the alternative model to the data. In this appendix we focus on the static
decision only.
A.1 Risk and Loss Aversion
Risk Aversion. One persistent finding from the Section 7 is that traders exhibit a
general tendency to act as contrarians. One might thus entertain the idea that traders
act as contrarians because of risk-aversion. We can go about examining this by computing
the optimal action when people have a concave utility function. We checked this employing
both CARA and CRRA utility functions:
utility
CARA
(payoff|action) = −eρ·payoff, utility
CRRA
(payoff|action) =
payoff1−γ
1− γ
.
Theoretically, the CARA utility function is the superior choice in the framework since we
can ignore income effects.
For each type we determined the optimal action given the respective utility function
and compared it to the action taken by the subjects. Within a setup with risk-aversion,
a pass is indeed an action that has payoff consequences and may be optimal for some
posterior probabilities. Usually, as prices (and thus the probability of a high outcome)
rise, the optimal action changes from a buy to a pass to a sell. Risk-aversion biases
decisions against buys and holds, because sells yield an immediate cash flow, whereas
holding the stock exposes the subject to the risky future payoff. The larger the risk-
aversion coefficient, the stronger the bias against buying.
Computing the expected utilities we find, however, that the performance of a model
with risk aversion is worse for all reasonable levels of risk aversion. For CRRA with log-
utility (γ = 1), it is 67% , which is below the risk-neutral model (70%) and the fit is
only 42% for the S2 types; for CARA with ρ = 2 it is 51% (the fit rises as ρ declines).
As ρ declines, we capture more of the behavior by S3 types but less of the behavior by S2
types. Note that as ρ falls, we move closer to risk neutrality.
Overall, we conclude that the assumption of risk-neutrality captures behavior quite
well, with risk-aversion playing at most a negligible role.
Loss-Aversion — S-Shaped Valuation Functions. A host of experimental work in
prospect theory following Kahneman and Tversky (1979) has indicated that people pick
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Total Number of
wrong decisions
CRRA utility,
γ = 1 (log-utility)
Total Number of
wrong decisions
CARA utility,
ρ = 2
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
T1 58 61 14 58 22 62
U-negative 3 24 66 61 85 80
95% 72% 18% 95% 26% 78%
T2 47 53 9 47 62 60
hill 13 46 61 60 99 70
78% 54% 13% 78% 63% 86%
T3 66 33 6 66 25 49
U-positive 10 59 54 76 92 60
87% 36% 10% 87% 27% 82%
T4 127 90 17 126 97 98
hill 25 57 104 152 147 121
84% 61% 14% 83% 66% 81%
T5 123 59 5 123 82 98
U-positive 30 124 101 153 183 106
80% 32% 5% 80% 45% 92%
T6 103 120 28 103 46 110
U-negative 18 60 119 121 180 147
85% 67% 19% 85% 26% 75%
Total% 84% 53% 14% 84% 42% 82%
T1-T3% 87% 53% 14% 87% 39% 81%
T4-T6% 83% 53% 13% 83% 44% 82%
Fit total 51% 67%
fit T1-T3 51% 66%
fit T4-T6 51% 67%
Table 13: Risk-Aversion Analysis.
choices based on change in their wealth rather than on levels of utilities. These costs
and benefits of changes in wealth are usually assessed with valuation functions that are
S-shaped. Kahnemann and Tversky suggested the following functional form
V (∆wealth|action) =
{
(∆wealth)α for ∆wealth ≥ 0
−γ(−∆wealth)β for ∆wealth < 0
where ∆wealth is the change in wealth and α, β, γ are parameters. A common specification
for the parameters stemming from experimental observations is α = β = 0.8 and γ = 2.25
(Tversky and Kahneman (1992)).
As with risk aversion, the performance of this model applied to our setup is much worse
than the performance of the rational model. For parameters as estimated by Tversky and
Kahneman (1992), the fit is below 49%. Table 14 illustrates this observation for the above
parameters as well as for one other configuration.22
22Arguably, we are only using one part of the tools developed in prospect theory, S-shaped valuations,
and ignore that other component, decision weights. However, the latter have a relation to re-scaled
probabilities which we analyze separately.
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Total Number of
wrong decisions
prospect theory,
α = β = 0.8, γ = 1
Total Number of
wrong decisions
prospect theory,
α = β = 0.8, γ = 2.25
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Treatment 1 negative hill-shape 20 81 37 22 82 37
36% 81% 51% 40% 82% 51%
Treatment 2 increasing 31 57 36 31 71 57
42% 63% 53% 42% 79% 84%
Treatment 3 negative U-shape 21 69 37 21 68 67
35% 73% 49% 35% 72% 88%
Treatment 4 decreasing 41 55 33 41 55 48
71% 56% 45% 71% 56% 65%
Treatment 5 positive U-shape 33 70 32 33 73 46
48% 71% 49% 48% 74% 71%
Treatment 6 negative hill-shape 41 60 22 41 60 22
47% 71% 38% 47% 71% 38%
Total number wrong 187 392 197 189 409 277
wrong percentage 46% 69% 48% 47% 72% 67%
Total model fit 43.8% 36.7%
Table 14: Loss-Aversion Analysis.
A.2 Decision Rule: Prior Actions or No Updating
One alternative decision rule formulation is that of na¨ıve traders who ignore the history
and who simply stick to their prior action. As such, S1 types always sell, S3 types always
buy and S2 types pick the action that is prescribed at the initial history. For instance,
with negative U-shape, S2 traders always sell.
This specification does no better than the rational model, fitting 71% of the data;
broken up by type the fit is similar to the rational model. Moreover, with this alternative
model, we cannot accommodate passes as ‘weak buys’ because this would be contrary to
the spirit of ‘no changes of the action’. Indeed this illustrates the first weakness: a model
based on people choosing their prior action will not help us to understand any changes
in behavior that might have occurred, in particular not for S1 and S3 types. Since the
econometric analysis has already revealed that traders are sensitive to the price, this
decision rule is rather weak.
A weaker variation of the ‘stick to the prior action’-theme has traders ignore the
history altogether but remain mindful of the price. Traders thus act based only their
prior expectation: if the price exceeds it, they sell, if the price is below it, they buy.
And indeed about 75% of people take an action that is in accordance with their prior
expectation. For instance, for the S3 types this means that they do not buy when they
should be buying, or for the S2 types that they do not herd when they should be herding.
A.3 Probability Scaling and Shifting
A yet weaker version of the no-updating alternative rule is probability shifting, whereby
traders underplay (overplay) low (high) probabilities coming from the observed history
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No updating prior action
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
T1 60 62 64 58 63 64
U-negative 61 85 80 61 85 80
98% 73% 80% 95% 74% 80%
T2 47 61 63 47 53 61
hill 60 99 70 60 99 70
78% 62% 90% 78% 54% 87%
T3 66 47 47 66 46 49
U-positive 76 92 60 76 92 60
87% 51% 78% 87% 50% 82%
T4 134 108 97 127 74 97
hill 152 147 121 152 147 121
88% 73% 80% 84% 50% 80%
T5 123 81 97 123 80 99
U-positive 153 183 106 153 183 106
80% 44% 92% 80% 44% 93%
T6 103 115 118 103 89 114
U-negative 121 180 147 121 180 147
85% 64% 80% 85% 49% 78%
Total% 86% 60% 83% 84% 52% 83%
T1-T3% 88% 62% 83% 87% 59% 83%
T4-T6% 85% 60% 83% 83% 48% 83%
Fit total 75% 71%
fit T1-T3 76% 74%
fit T4-T6 75% 69%
Table 15: No Updating and Prior Actions.
Ht−1. Alternatively, traders may overstate the probabilities of their prior expectations; we
present results from the latter but point out, that the former yields similar insights. The
usual symmetric treatment of this under- or overstating of probabilities is to transform
probability p into f(p)23 as follows
f(p) =
pα
pα + (1− p)α
.
Parameter values α > 1 are associated with S-shaped re-valuations (high probabilities get
overstated, low probabilities understated), α < 1 with reverse S-shaped valuations (high
probabilities get understated, low probabilities overstated). Note that transformation f(p)
applied to probabilities of all three states do not yield a probability distribution. How-
ever, when employed properly in the conditional posterior expectation the transformation
achieves the effect of a probability distribution.
Consequently, when modeling an overconfident trader who puts more weight on his
23There are various other forms for these switches, e.g. non-symmetric switches where the effects are
stronger (or weaker) for larger probabilities. The interpretation and implementation of such asymmet-
ric shifts does, however, become difficult if not impossible with three states. Of the various possible
specifications we only pick a few as the spirit of all re-scalings is similar: updating is slowed.
In f , one re-scales pα by itself and the counter-probability; alternatively, if pi signifies the probability
of one state, one could imagine a re-scaling by pj
α for all states, j = 1, . . . , 3.
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prior signal we would apply an α > 1 re-scaling on the initial probabilities. Alternatively,
one can also model slow updating directly by applying an α < 1 re-scaling to the posterior
probabilities. Of course the effect will be similar: in both cases the histories or updated
probabilities would be less important to traders than under the rational model. We
considered both specifications.
Here we report the results where Pr(V |H1)×Pr(S|V ) has been re-scaled with an α > 1;
downward scaled probabilities of the history Pr(V |Ht) yield similar insights.
With α = 25 With α = 10 With α = 5
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
T1 58 60 66 58 35 66 58 25 66
U-negative 3 25 14 3 50 14 3 60 14
95% 71% 83% 95% 41% 83% 95% 29% 83%
T2 47 69 61 47 69 61 47 68 61
hill 13 30 9 13 30 9 13 31 9
78% 70% 87% 78% 70% 87% 78% 69% 87%
T3 66 59 54 66 59 54 66 59 54
U-positive 10 33 6 10 33 6 10 33 6
87% 64% 90% 87% 64% 90% 87% 64% 90%
T4 127 110 104 127 110 104 127 110 104
hill 25 37 17 25 37 17 25 37 17
84% 75% 86% 84% 75% 86% 84% 75% 86%
T5 123 124 101 123 124 101 123 121 101
U-positive 30 59 5 30 59 5 30 62 5
80% 68% 95% 80% 68% 95% 80% 66% 95%
T6 103 99 119 103 77 119 103 62 119
U-negative 18 81 28 18 103 28 18 118 28
85% 55% 81% 85% 43% 81% 85% 34% 81%
Total% 84% 66% 86% 84% 60% 86% 84% 57% 86%
T1-T3% 87% 68% 86% 87% 59% 86% 87% 55% 86%
T4-T6% 83% 65% 87% 83% 61% 87% 83% 57% 87%
Fit total 78% 75% 74%
fit T1-T3 79% 75% 74%
fit T4-T6 77% 75% 74%
Table 16: Overweighting of the Prior.
Comparing the results here to those in Table 1, one can see that the fit of prior
overweighing hardly improves for the S1 and S3 types. Moreover, while the total fit does
improve relative to the rational model, it does not improve dramatically. Most of the
improvement stems from contrarian trades that are now given a rationale. At the same
time, re-scaling does a poor job explaining herd-behavior of any sort.
A.4 Error Correction Provisions
Inspired by level K reasoning (see Costa-Gomes, Crawford and Broseta (2001)) and
Quantal Response Equilibria (see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) and McKelvey and Pal-
frey (1998)), we will contemplate an alternative specification for hampered updating in
which agents do not trust that their peers act fully rationally. In the rational model,
consider a buy without herding in state Vi: this event occurs with probability βi =
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.25/2+ .75 ·Pr(S3|Vi) (recalling that .25/2 is the probability of a noise buy). Now imagine
that instead subjects believe that only fraction δ of the informed buyers act rationally
and that the remaining 1 − δ take a decision at random. Then the probability of a buy
in state Vi becomes
βi = .25 + .75((1− δ)/2 + δ · Pr(S3|Vi)).
The task is then to find the δ for which this specification yields the best fit with the data.
We obtained the best fit for δ = 2/15. However, compared to the rational model the
improvement of the fit is minor (see Table 17): the rational fit is 70% vs. 73% with error
correction provisions.
An alternative interpretation for this error correction is that the level of noise trading
is perceived higher than it actually is because other subjects act randomly: a δ of 2/15
translates into a factual noise level of 90%. As the informational impact of each transaction
on the subject’s beliefs is dampened, after any history the private signal has a larger
impact than under the rational model. This specification is thus in spirit similar to
probability shifting, but focuses on the idea that subjects believe that others either ignore
their signals or are simply unable to interpret it correctly.
A variation on this error correction theme is a specification in which a subject believes
that fraction 1 − δ act randomly but the subject assumes that the remaining fraction δ
takes this irrationality into account and reacts rationally to it. The difference to the first
specification is that in the first, the subject not only assumes irrationality on the part of
informed traders but also considers himself to be the only informed trader to take this
into consideration. Now we instead allow a later subject to believe that his predecessors
are also aware of the possible irrationality on the part of informed traders and employ this
knowledge in their decision-making. Consequently, in the first specification, S3 traders
would never have been presumed to rationally sell, whereas in the second specification
such behavior is admitted as rational.24 Alas, as with the simple error correction, we do
not obtain a substantially better fit with the data, as can be gleaned from Table 17: we
obtained the best fit for δ = 0 in which case people act only on the basis of their prior
expectation and do not update. For δ = .22 (presented in the table; the figures for δ = 0
coincide with those of the no-updating case), the fit is best for treatments T1-T3 (T4-T6
have the best fit for δ = 0). In the latter case, the improvement for treatments T1-T3
24Rather than directly implementing level K reasoning or Quantal Response Equilibria, we choose our
alternative specification because it is an unusually complex task for the subjects to calculate these more
general measures of naive reasoning with 4 different known types of traders (noise traders and three
types of informed trader). Moreover, there is a subtle difference of our approach to the way that Quantal
Response Models can be implemented in models with and without prices. In an informational cascade
without prices a deviation from the cascading action is, in principle, a deviation from rationality. With
moving prices, such a simple observation can no longer be made, neither is it possible for subjects to
determine if there is a genuine error. Our notion of overweighing noise is therefore a simple means for
subjects to model the lack of trust in predecessors’ actions, without implying a definitive or systematic
direction of the error. Traders thus act as if the proportion of noise traders were higher than 25% by
downgrading the quality of information extracted from the history of actions embodied in Ht−1 or qt.
Finally, since we already have noise traders built into the experiment, by opting to allow traders to
increase their estimates of the percentage of expected noise trades above 25% our method is arguably
an especially simple and intuitive rule of thumb which enables subjects to incorporate naive reasoning
on the part of their peers. For more on rules of thumb by laboratory subjects in a herding context see
Ivanov et al. (2008).
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only is from 69.8% to 76.1%.
In summary, a model specification in which agents recursively take their predecessor’s
decisions as prone to error provides a worse fit with a data than the overweighing of one’s
own signal. Compared to the rational model there is an improvement of fit, though it is
small.
simple noise shift simple noise shift level 2 noise shift
δ = 2/15 δ = 1/3 δ = .22
S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
T1 58 61 60 58 60 65 58 61 66
U-negative 3 24 20 3 25 15 3 24 14
95% 72% 75% 95% 71% 81% 95% 72% 83%
T2 47 64 63 47 58 63 47 66 63
hill 13 35 7 13 41 7 13 33 7
78% 65% 90% 78% 59% 90% 78% 67% 90%
T3 66 44 47 66 42 48 66 44 49
U-positive 10 48 13 10 50 12 10 48 11
87% 48% 78% 87% 46% 80% 87% 48% 82%
T4 127 94 98 127 92 98 127 94 98
hill 25 53 23 25 55 23 25 53 24
84% 64% 81% 84% 63% 81% 84% 64% 80%
T5 123 69 97 123 64 97 123 67 98
U-positive 30 114 9 30 119 9 30 116 8
80% 38% 92% 80% 35% 92% 80% 37% 92%
T6 103 116 117 103 97 114 103 108 114
U-negative 18 64 30 18 83 33 18 72 33
85% 64% 80% 85% 54% 78% 85% 60% 78%
Total% 84% 57% 83% 84% 53% 83% 84% 56% 83%
T1-T3% 87% 61% 81% 87% 58% 84% 87% 62% 85%
T4-T6% 83% 55% 83% 83% 50% 83% 83% 53% 83%
Fit total 73% 71% 72.9%
fit T1-T3 75% 74% 76%
fit T4-T6 72% 70% 71%
Table 17: Variations in the Perception of Noise Trading.
A.5 Summary of Alternative Behavioral Explanations
While forms of slow updating improve the fit of the data slightly, no alternative model is
capable of providing a convincing explanation for the results. Slow updating, overweighing
of one’s own signal, and overestimating noise trading are essentially very similar, and also
have strong similarities to a strategy of following the prior (which is a policy of zero
updating).
Several studies (Drehmann, Oechssler and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino
(2005)) have already identified that when prices rise, people with high signals tend to
act as contrarians, i.e. they sell. There are multiple possible explanations, ranging from
risk aversion (which we refute) to slow or no updating. We observe the same kind of
end-point behavior by the S3 types. Symmetrically, the S1 types should exhibit similar
behavior when prices approach the lower bound. However our data rarely involves prices
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that fall to a sufficient extent to examine the symmetric claim, since in general across
all treatments, prices tend to tentatively rise. Note that the end-point effect should also
influence the S2 types, because whatever mechanism or cognitive bias leads S3 types to
sell for high prices should apply in the same manner to S2 types.
Irrespective of which hypothesis is correct, if the end result is observationally equiva-
lent to slow updating then this has a profound effect on how much herding or contrarian
behavior one might expect to see: when people update slowly, it takes longer for them to
reach a (subjective) expectation for which they would herd. However, with slow updating,
they will also be slower to reduce prices and thus it is conceivable that they herd when
prices move “against” the herd.
Appendices
The time-line in appendix 1 gives a complete run down of the structure of a typical
experimental setting and the text (not the section headings) of the instructions detailed
in appendix 2 are a reproduction of what is read to the subjects during the experiment.
Answers to questions are of course unscripted, but all other communication with subjects
was kept to a minimum. An example information sheet given to the subjects is reproduced
in appendix 3 and the questionnaire is reproduced in appendix 4. Practical detail about
the software used is provided in appendix 5.
B Time-line
What follows is a precise chronological ordering of events during the experiment.
1. The room is prepared and software pre-loaded into the machines to be used, which
are allocated each to one ID number.
2. Read instructions 1 including random distribution of ID cards and seat subjects on
the basis of the allocated ID cards.
3. Read instructions 2 including the completion and collection of permission forms.
4. Read instructions 3 which explains the experimental setting.
5. Read instructions 4 which explains the software.
6. Read instructions 5 which explains the compensation.
7. Read instructions 6 which explains the information setting.
8. Read instructions 7 which summarizes the instructions and pause to answer any
questions.
9. Run treatment 1 (the example round).
10. Pause to answer final questions.
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11. Run treatments 2-7.
12. Read instructions 8, which ends the experiment.
13. Calculate and distribute payments while participants complete receipts and ques-
tionnaires.
C Instructions
Note that the parts of the instructions in bold indicate that a name, number or currency
be included in the instructions which vary by session. Words in italics are emphasized.
and pause to answer any questions. The instructions are long, and the pre-experimental
instructions (1-7) took an average of around 25 minutes to deliver including typical ques-
tions. Payment calculations typically took around 5 minutes during which subjects were
asked to shut down open software and complete a questionnaire.
Instructions 1 (Welcome)
Welcome to everyone participating in today’s experiment. My name is [name] and my
assistants for today will be [names]. The experiment should take around one and half
to two hours and will mainly involve using a computer. I ask that for the entirety of the
experiment you refrain from talking unless you wish to ask a clarifying question or point
out a computer error to me or one of my assistants, and you will be told when you can and
cannot ask questions. You will be paid a turn up fee of £5 [equivalent in Canadian
dollars] and can earn anything up to a further £25 [equivalent in Canadian dollars]
based on your performance, so try to do your best! I will now distribute your ID cards.
Please keep these safe as they not only determine where you will sit, but also what your
payments will be. Actions during this experiment are anonymous in the sense that we are
aware only of your ID number as indicated on your ID card when calculating payments
and not your names. Please could you now take a seat in front of the computer indicated
by your ID number. The computers are all divided by large screens for a reason, so please
do not attempt to examine other people’s computers.
Instructions 2 (After Seated)
After taking a seat make sure you are using the computer that is appropriate for your
ID number. You will notice that there is a graph displayed on the screen with several
on-screen buttons which are currently not highlighted. Next please read and sign the
permission form using the pen provided. The permission form confirms that you have
given permission for us to use you as willing participants in this experiment. You will also
need to complete a receipt which you will be given at the end of the experiment before
your receive your payment. My assistant(s) and I will now collect your permission forms.
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Instructions 3 (The Experimental Setting)
Next I will describe the experiment itself. You will be participating in a series of financial
market trading exercises. There will be 7 trading rounds, and each round will last 3-4
minutes. There are [number of participants] participants in the room and everyone
is involved in the same trading exercise. Your objective should be to take the most
thorough decision possible in order to maximize the money you will make today. The
general situation is the following: you are the stockholder of a company and have some
cash in hand. Some event may happen to your company that affects the value of the
company (for better or worse). You have a broker who provides you with his best guess.
You then have to decide whether you want to buy an additional share of the company,
whether you want to sell your share, or whether you want to do nothing. We will look at a
variety of similar situations: each situation concerns a different company, and we will vary
the information and the trading rules in each situation. Please note that the situation
described to you in each round is independent of that in any other round. In other
words, what you learned in round 1 tells you nothing about round 2, etc. In the process
of this session you may or may not generate virtual profits. Your trading activities will
be recorded automatically; these activities determine your trading profits.
Before each round starts, you are given one share of the company and you have suffi-
cient cash to buy a share. Round 1 will be an example round and your final payment will
not reflect how you perform during this round.
During the rounds you may sell your share, you may buy one additional share or you
may do nothing. You can only trade within a specific time window indicated by the
software a red blinking bar appearing around the trading buttons below the graph. You
will receive a notification by the system on your screen and then you have 5 seconds to
make your trade. The frantic blinking will continue for 5 seconds irrespective of whether
you trade or not. Note that you can trade only once, in other words, you can only buy or
sell, you cannot do both. Once you have hit the button it may take the system a second
or two to register your trade. You should not double-click or attempt to click more than
once.
There will be a pause after round 1, the example round, when you can answer ques-
tions. During rounds 2-7 you will be required to remain silent.
Instructions 4 (The Software)
Now please examine your computer screen, without hitting any buttons. Before you is a
screen that contains several pieces of information:
1. It tells you about all the trades that occur during the round; you also see when a
trade occurs and whether or not someone bought or sold a share. For your conve-
nience, there is a graph that plots the sequence of prices.
2. Your screen also lists the current market price; people can either buy a share at this
price or they can sell their share at this price.
3. In the case where we restrict the time when you can make a trade, a red bar will
appear on the bottom of the screen to highlight the fact that you can trade. During
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this time the buy, sell and pass buttons will be available for your use, typically only
once per round, though twice in the final 3 rounds.
4. There is also a box in which you receive some information from your ”broker” which
I will explain in a few moments.
5. The screen includes a timer which indicates how many seconds have gone past during
the round.
6. Finally, the screen updates itself whenever a trade is made.
Note that you are not directly interacting with any of the other participants in the
experiment, rather the actions of all of the traders including you and your fellow partici-
pants will effect the current price which is set by the central computer being operated at
the front of the experimental laboratory such that a decision to purchase by a trader will
raise price and to sell will lower it. This central computer will also be producing trades
itself which will account for 25% of all the possible trades during each round and will be
determined randomly so there is a 50% chance a computer trader will buy and a 50%
chance he will sell.
Instructions 5 (Compensation)
Next I will describe the payment you will receive. You will receive £5 [Canadian equiv-
alent] in cash for showing up today. You can add to that up to a further £25 [Canadian
equivalent] as a bonus payment. In this trading experiment, you will be buying or sell-
ing a share (with virtual units of a virtual currency), and this trading may or may not
lead to virtual profits. Your bonus payment depends on how much profit you generate in
total across all of the rounds with the exception of the example round. In general, the
more thorough your decisions are, the greater are your chances of making profits, and the
higher will be your bonus.
I will next explain virtual profits. When you trade you will do so at the current price
appearing on your computer screen. The initial price is 100 virtual currency units (vcu).
This price changes based upon the trading that goes on during the round including those
by your fellow participants and the random computer traders. While you will trade today
during the experiment, we can imagine that after the end of each round of trading there
is a second day during which the event (good, bad or neutral) is realized and the price
of the share is updated to reflect this: this will be either 75, 100 or 125 vcu. To stress,
which price is realized depends upon which event takes place:
• if something good happens to the company, the price will be 125 after the realization
of the event;
• if something bad happens, so the price will be 75;
• if neither of these, so the price reverts to the initial value of 100.
Your profit relates to the difference between the current price that you buy or sell a
share at today, and the price revealed after the event takes place. An example of a good
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event happening to the company might be that it wins a court case or gains a patent. A
bad thing might be the opposite, so the firm loses a court case or fails to gain a patent.
Note that as already stressed, each round is an independent experiment, so in round 1 it
may be that the bad event takes place so the share price becomes 75 after trading finishes,
while in round 2 it may be worth 125, etc.
Next I will go through some simple numerical examples of what might happen.
Example 1 If you buy a share at a price of 90 vcu, and after the event takes place the
price of the share is updated to 125 vcu. You have therefore made 35 vcu of virtual profits
on your trade. If you instead sold at 90 vcu you would have lost 35 vcu. If you did nothing
you would make a profit of 25 vcu since your share was originally worth 100 vcu and is
worth 125 vcu after the event is realized.
Example 2 If you buy a share at a price of 110 vcu, and after the event takes place the
price of the share is updated to 100 vcu you have lost 10 vcu of virtual profits on your
trade. If you instead sold at 110 vcu you would have made 10 vcu. If you did nothing you
would have neither made a profit or a loss on your trade.
So note that what matters is the price when you take an action and the true value after
the good, bad or neutral event. Which event occurs will not be revealed to you during the
experiment though you will receive information about which is more likely before the start
of trading. I will explain the nature of this information in a moment.
Please remember that each round represents a completely different situation with a
different share and a different firm. In every round you may make or lose virtual profits
and by the end the central computer will have a complete record of your performance.
On the basis of your overall performance the central computer will calculate your bonus
payment.
Instructions 6 (The Information Setting)
I will now explain the broker’s tip and the information you have before each round begins.
Next to your computer is a set of sheets which correspond to each round. For example,
the top sheet is called ”Example Round 1”, and has several pieces of information about
the share. For instance the sheet indicates to you the chance that the share price will
be 75, 100 or 125 vcu after the event. Next it indicates what sort of broker’s tips you
might receive. Each participant has identical sheets, the text, numbers and diagrams are
literally the same for every participant.
Your broker will give you a tip via your computer screen that indicates his view about
what sort of event will occur. He might give you a ”good tip” (which we call S3), ”bad
tip” (S1) or ”middle tip” (S2). A good S3 tip indicates that he believes the event will be
good and the share price will be 125 vcu after it is realized, a bad S1 tip that something
bad will happen indicates 75 after the event is realized. A middle S2 tip is a bit more
complex but indicates he feels 100 vcu is his best guess:
• It could mean that he believes nothing at all will happen hence he believes the price
will revert to the original 100 vcu and we call this case 1.
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• Or it could mean that he believes an event will happen but he is not sure whether
it is either good or bad, and we call this case 2.
• Or it could mean that he believes something good or bad will happen and he has
a feel for which, but he is not sufficiently sure to indicate the good or bad tip and
would prefer to indicate middle and we call this case 3.
Before each round you are told which case would apply if you receive a middle signal
together with a background probability that there will be a good, neutral or bad event
which will make tomorrow’s price 75, 100 or 125 respectively.
Unlike the contents of the information sheet the tip you receive is private to you, and
other participants may receive the same or a different tip. In other words it is possible
that your broker might believe a good event is going to happen so the price will be 125
after this realization, while other participants might have brokers who agree or disagree
with your broker’s tip. There are also other pieces of information on the sheet including
the probability that the broker is correct when he gives you a tip, and this probability is
the same for all participants.
You will be given 2 minutes to examine the relevant sheet before each round. You
will then receive notification on your computer screen of the actual tip sent to you from
the broker: S1, S2 or S3, and will have another minute to consider this. The beginning of
the round will then be announced and trading will begin. Remember you can only trade
during the 5 second window indicated by a red bar on your screen. The buttons on the
screen (buy, sell or pass) can only be pressed during this time and only once per round.
Instructions 7 (Summary)
To summarize, you are in a market experiment with a central computer that both records
your actions and produces random trades (which account for 25% of all trades). All other
participants will also have the opportunity to trade. You will receive a private signal from
a broker and other information pertaining to the price of the share after a possible event
occurs, including the likelihood of the broker being correct. The information on your
information sheet is common to everyone (for example, everyone’s broker is just as likely
to be correct as yours), but the broker’s signal is private to you while others will receive a
signal which may be the same or different from yours. Each market participant, yourself
included, has their own different broker in each round. The rounds are all different in the
sense that the share is for a different company, the broker is different and earlier actions
and prices are not relevant. You will make virtual profits based on the difference between
your trading price in vcu and the price after the event which will be 75, 100 or 125 vcu.
The total of your virtual profits across all rounds, excluding the example round, will be
used to calculate your bonus payment. To maximize your bonus payment you will then
have to make high virtual profits and therefore make as thorough a decision as you can.
Please do not talk, signal or make noises to other participants, please do not show
anyone your screen or discuss your information, please do not try to look at other people’s
screens and we would appreciate it if would not leave the room until the experiment is
over.
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You may ask questions now or just after the example round. Once we begin rounds
2-7 you will not be allowed to ask clarifying questions, though you should inform us if
there is a software problem.
Instructions 8 (Experiment End)
Many thanks for participating in today’s experiment. Please remain in your seats for a
minute or two while we use the central computer to calculate your final payments. We
ask that you close the trading software and any other open software and shut down your
computer. We also ask that you leave the pen and all sheets on your desks, and keep
only the ID card which you will need to bring with you to the front desk in order to
receive your payment. When you receive your payment you will also be asked to complete
and sign a receipt. It would be useful if you could complete the questionnaire that is on
your desk, and hand it in as you leave, though this is not compulsory. After you leave,
we ask that you try to avoid any discussion of this experiment with any other potential
participants, and once again many thanks for your participation.
D Information Sheets
Here we present an example ”information sheet” comprised of some text and two diagrams.
The one presented here is taken from the example round, but one of these was provided
for each treatment.
E Questionnaire
Many thanks for taking part in today’s experiment. The official part of the experiment
is now over. Your payments are now being worked out and you will be paid based on
your ID number (the computer you are using). Please answer the following questions. In
particular this will help us to make future experiments better and may help us understand
the results.
About you
1. Your age:
2. Your gender:
3. Your degree subject:
4. Have you ever owned shares?
5. Do you have any experience of financial markets? (if so, what are your experiences)
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About your decisions today
6. What made you decide to buy, sell or pass?
7. How important was the current price?
8. How important was the past price data (the graph)?
9. How important was your “broker’s tip”?
10. What else mattered?
11. Did you make any calculations? If so, which ones?
About the experiment
12. Anything else you would like to report, including how to make the experiment better,
can be done so here:
F The Software
The trading market was simulated through a software engine, run on a central computer,
networked to a number of client machines each running the one version of the client
for each subject. The central computer acted to record and analyze results, as well as
to distribute signals (through an administrator application) and provide a continuously
updated price chart for subjects. The sequence of signals and noise trades was pre-
specified and the computer also organized the allocations of time-slots for each trader and
noise trades and it provided an indication to traders of when they could trade.
Figure 6 shows the administrator software. The screen shot is not taken from an actual
session, but simply shows the layout on screen for a fictional session. It is currently listed
as recording the activity of traders in “Treatment 1”. As can be seen in the figure there
are more noise traders than would be normal in an actual session (indicated by the final
letter N, whereas subjects are indicated by a final ID number). As can be seen here trader
HEG5P3 has “timed out” (failed to act in their 5 second window, which is a feature not
present in the current experiment but is part of the setup in our prequel paper).
The client software provided a simple to use graphical interface which enabled subjects
to observe private information (their signal), and public information (the movement of
prices and the current price), as well as indicating to them when they could trade (flashing
red and enabling trading buttons) and providing the means of trade (buy, sell and pass
buttons). Figure 7 below shows a screen shot of the software in action.
Here you can see that the price initially rose from a level of 100, indicating buying at
the early stages, but then price started to fall back, it rallied and then fell back further
to a value of around 116. This subject’s private signal was S1 (”bad”) and the subject
had a single share to sell and a large cash balance to enable the purchase of a further
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share. The subject could also pass (declining to buy or sell) when given the opportunity
to trade.
The software was purposefully built for the experiment, since existing software was
unable to provide the sort of information structure needed in a price-driven (as opposed
to order-driven) market.25
25Further details about the software are available on request from the authors.
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Example Round 1 
Signals: Case 2 
x If you receive signal S1 (the “bad” signal), then the broker indicates a 
negative impact. 
x If you receive signal S3 (the “good” signal), then the broker indicates a 
positive impact. 
x If you receive signal S2 (the “middle”), then the broker indicates that there 
is an effect but he is not sure which one; he is leaning towards negative. 
The broker provides you with his best guess; he may be wrong. He makes his 
best guess on the basis of data that he analyses. For instance, if the true 
announcement effect is going to be positive, the broker is likely to find data that 
makes him conclude that something positive is about to happen. But – he may 
also read the data the wrong way. In other words, the broker makes his statement 
with certain probabilities, and these depend on the true effect of the 
announcement. 
If the true effect is POSITIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 5% (he gets it badly wrong) 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 25% (he thinks nothing happens 
although it does) 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 70% (he gets it right) 
If the true effect is NEGATIVE then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 65% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 30% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 5% 
If indeed the effect is NO EFFECT then you receive  
x Signal S1 (bad) with chance 45% 
x Signal S2 (no effect) with chance 10% 
x Signal S3 (good) with chance 45% 
0%
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100%
negative impact no impact positive impact
low signal middle signal high signal
Probability of receiving a signal, given the true value 
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Figure 6: The Administrative Interface
Figure 7: The Trading Client
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